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Abstract: Neuroconstructivism: How the Brain Constructs Cognition proposes a unifying framework for the study of cognitive
development that brings together (1) constructivism (which views development as the progressive elaboration of increasingly
complex structures), (2) cognitive neuroscience (which aims to understand the neural mechanisms underlying behavior), and (3)
computational modeling (which proposes formal and explicit specifications of information processing). The guiding principle of our
approach is context dependence, within and (in contrast to Marr [1982]) between levels of organization. We propose that three
mechanisms guide the emergence of representations: competition, cooperation, and chronotopy; which themselves allow for two
central processes: proactivity and progressive specialization. We suggest that the main outcome of development is partial
representations, distributed across distinct functional circuits. This framework is derived by examining development at the level of
single neurons, brain systems, and whole organisms. We use the terms encellment, embrainment, and embodiment to describe the
higher-level contextual influences that act at each of these levels of organization. To illustrate these mechanisms in operation we
provide case studies in early visual perception, infant habituation, phonological development, and object representations in infancy.
Three further case studies are concerned with interactions between levels of explanation: social development, atypical development
and within that, developmental dyslexia. We conclude that cognitive development arises from a dynamic, contextual change in
embodied neural structures leading to partial representations across multiple brain regions and timescales, in response to
proactively specified physical and social environment.
Keywords: brain; cognition; development; constructivism; embodiment
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1. Introduction
Neuroconstructivism draws on three traditions. The first is
the constructivist view of development attributed to Piaget
and his contemporaries, such as the developmental bio-
logist Waddington. “Neuro” introduces the second tra-
dition: a commitment to view psychological development
as entwined with the mechanistic and morphological
aspects of brain development, from cell to brain to body.
Third is computational modeling, which forces process
theories to be explicit about the nature of information
processing, resulting in a level of specification that
eludes traditional, verbal, descriptive theories. Two
recent books brought two of these three traditions
together. Rethinking innateness (Elman et al. 1996)
argued for a connectionist modeling approach to under-
standing brain and cognitive development. In contrast, A
dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition
and action (Thelen & Smith 1994) emphasized develop-
ment as occurring in the context of embodiment. In Neu-
roconstructivism, volume 1: How the brain constructs
cognition (Mareschal et al. 2007a), we add a focus on
neural development and the development of
representations.
Neuroconstructivism1 emphasizes the interrelation
between brain development and cognitive development.
We see constructivist development as a progressive
increase in the complexity of representations, with the
consequence that new competences can develop based
on earlier, simpler ones. This increase in represen-
tational complexity is realized in the brain by a progress-
ive elaboration of cortical structures. Thus, while other
constructivist theories have emphasized the notion of
hierarchical integration of knowledge (e.g., Karmiloff-
Smith 1992; Piaget 1970), we explore the relationship
between the elaboration of knowledge and the develop-
ment of new cognitive abilities. We assert that increases
in representational complexity arise as a natural conse-
quence of the processes of adaptation typical of
complex biological systems like the brain (for related
views see Mareschal & Shultz 1996; Quartz & Sejnowski
1997; Shultz 2003). Neuroconstructivism implies the
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creation of genuinely new cognitive abilities and not just
the better use of preexisting abilities.
While our focus is on the development of mental
representations, these develop in a physical and social
environment. The body, which changes substantially
during infancy, constrains what the infant can experience,
process, and do. This, in turn, constrains possible learning
and development. For example, the limited visual acuity of
babies helps simplify the visual environment, and could
also help with the integration of modalities as the clearest
objects are those within reach. Physical constraints on
action also force a “starting small” situation, whereby the
child learns simpler effective behavior before being able
to acquire more complex abilities. The social environment
also constrains what and how the child will learn. The use
of motherese, for instance, simplifies the linguistic input
early in language acquisition. Indeed, most human
societies engage in a process of gradually exposing
infants and children to the kinds of problems that they
will need to master in order to survive.
The guiding principle behind our approach is context
dependence. Representations in the brain do not emerge
or function in isolation, but within the context of cooccurring
molecular, neural, bodily, and social events. This constrains
and guides emerging representation through three mechan-
isms: cooperation, competition, and chronotopy (see section
2.4). The mechanisms take different forms at the different
levels of implementation, but together they enable two
central developmental processes: proactivity, which is con-
cerned with the role of internally generated activity in the
development of function, and progressive specialization,
the fact that functions exhibit a progressive restriction of
fate by becoming more specific and less plastic.
We argue that the outcome of these developmental
mechanisms and processes are partial representations.
The brain acquires and develops multiple, fragmentary
representations that are just sufficient for on-the-fly pro-
cessing. The role of developmental psychology is to under-
stand how and why such partial representations emerge,
how they interact, and how flexibile their configuration is.
One novel aspect of our approach is that our emphasis
on context requires consistency among levels of expla-
nation. We view cognitive functions as inextricably
linked to their neural implementation and to the
dynamic environments in which they emerge and
operate, with interactions going both ways across levels.
As far as explaining cognitive development, we see little
merit in theories or models that fit data at one level,
however well, yet contradict what is known at other
levels. Thus, we argue for a radical rejection of Marr’s
(1982) independent levels of analysis argument. While
explanations can be formulated independently at different
levels of description, those levels are not themselves inde-
pendent. A consequence of our focus on consistency is
parsimony. If a phenomenon can be explained at different
levels using a unitary framework, then this is preferable to
an alternative where different and inconsistent interpret-
ations are used at each level.
In the next section, we lay out the foundations of
neuroconstructivism, culminating with a proposed set
of principles, mechanisms, and processes. Section 3 illus-
trates these ideas through the use of case studies in
which the neuroconstructivist framework is applied to
different domains of cognitive development. In a
concluding section, we identify future challenges and
briefly discuss Neuroconstructivism, volume 2: Perspec-
tives and prospects.
2. Foundations
2.1. Encellment
The development of the nervous system is typically
described as a two-stage process. Initially, coarse structure
and connectivity is laid out, with little contribution from the
electrical activity of neurons. Then, the firing of neurons
becomes crucial in establishing the finer-grained details of
connectivity. Therefore, to examine brain development at
the cellular level, we need to distinguish between context-
dependent and activity-dependent processes (Crowley &
Katz 1999; Herrmann & Shatz 1995).
In the early stages of neural development, activity prob-
ably plays the smallest of any role in the outcome. In neu-
rogenesis, precursor cells (neuroblasts) differentiate into
neurons, glial cells, or new precursor cells. The outcome
of differentiation is affected both by the lineage of the
cell and, crucially, by cell-cell interactions. A new
neuron then migrates to its final position, either by
passive displacement (i.e., being pushed by other emer-
ging neurons) or with the help of radial glial cells that
guide neural migration. Thus, local cellular context plays
a key role in the formation of neural structures.
Neural differentiation begins during, or towards the end
of, migration. Axons often traverse long distances (Purves
et al. 1997), facilitated by a mixture of activity-dependent
and activity-independent processes. A neurite (the neuron
outgrowth that will become the axon) develops protrusions
that will travel in space in response to both chemical and
physical extracellular events. Particular cues guide axonal
growth while others impair it, and processes can seek specific
target locations with a unique chemical signature (Goodman
& Shatz 1993). Once in a target area, an axon forms specific
connections with dendrites through competition with other
dendrites and other axons. Endogenous electrical activity
also plays a role in early, presynaptic neural differentiation
such that early in brain development, one observes key
roles for both context- and activity-dependence.
Overproduction of cells leads to programmed cell death
(Oppenheim 1991). The death of a neuron is controlled
by a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic factors,
whereby an internal “suicide” program will be triggered
or suppressed by external chemical events involved in the
guidance and competition for neural differentiation
through trophic factors. Crucially, neural activity appears
to have a protective effect on neurons, as it reduces cell
death (Ghosh et al. 1994).
Activity-dependence is one part of a feedback loop with
morphology, with each affecting the other. The activity of
neurons can also alter subcellular ion channels and neuro-
transmitter receptors, so that the response profile of a
neuron is adaptive over time (Turrigiano et al. 1994).
Gene expression, too, can be affected by neural activity
(Armstrong & Montminy 1993). Activity-dependence
also affects the connectivity between cells. A good
example is the emergence of ocular dominance columns
(ODCs): Preventing sensory input to one eye considerably
reduces the space occupied by neurons responding to that
eye, illustrating activity-dependent competition.
Sirois et al.: Pre´cis of Neuroconstructivism
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Two competing theories have been proposed to explain
the emergence of cortical areas. One is the protomap view
(Rakic 1988), which suggests that neurons are predestined
early in development to occupy specific functions in
specific cortical areas. The second is the protocortex
view (O’Leary & Stanfield 1989), which argues that func-
tional areas emerge from interactions with subcortical
structures and between cortical areas. Recent reviews
propose a midway view in which patterns of gene
expression create, at a coarse scale, cortical areas more
suited to adopting particular functions as per the proto-
map view. However, a protocortex account better explains
the emergence of function within those poorly spatially
and functionally defined areas.
2.2. Embrainment
Embrainment refers to the view that functional areas of
the brain emerge and exist within a context of connections
to and from other functional areas. This contrasts with a
view of functional brain development in which regions
are presumed to mature in relative isolation of their
context, and with the view that particular cognitive oper-
ations can be localized to individual regions in adults. In
fact, there is substantial evidence that the functional prop-
erties of specific brain regions are highly constrained by
their past and present interactions with neighboring areas.
For example, visual event-related potential (ERP)com-
ponents of congenitally deaf people differ markedly from
those of typical hearing participants and participants who
became deaf after the age of four (Neville & Lawson
1987). Based on these findings, Neville and Lawson
(1987) proposed that early (but not late) lack of auditory
input allowed a reallocation of resources, such that cortical
areas typically involved in auditory processing were taken
over, to a degree, by visual processing. Similarly, it has
been shown that the visual cortex of people blind from
an early age can be activated by tactile stimuli, particularly
Braille reading. In both these examples, the differentiation
of the cortex into areas of functional specialization results
from a developmental process and is not functionally
encapsulated. If the context changes during development,
then so too can the function associated with a cortical area.
There are three important questions to consider when
studying the etiology of brain functions. First, does develop-
ment involve deterministic epigenesis or probabilistic epi-
genesis (Gottlieb 2007)? With the former, the assumption
is a unidirectional path between gene and brain function.
With the latter, the relationship between genes, structure,
and function is bidirectional and dynamic. Second, is
there a direct mapping between brain structure and func-
tion, and does this change over development? The third
question concerns the nature of brain plasticity, and
whether the degree of plasticity changes over development.
A substantial amount of research concerned with
mapping brain and behavioral development has taken a
maturational viewpoint, whereby emerging behaviors are
construed to reflect underlying maturing functions of iso-
lated areas of the brain (see Diamond 1991). A tacit assump-
tion is that the typical adult brain (and thus behavior) is
prespecified in a protomap (deterministic epigenesis), with
a direct mapping between structure and function. Within
this view, plasticity is a special mechanism activated by
brain injury. An alternative to the maturational view is the
skill-learning perspective, which proposes a continuity
between infancy and adulthood in the mechanisms under-
lying brain learning and plasticity. According to this view,
plasticity is a long-lasting feature of the brain that appears
to be reduced only within a context of the stable constraints
that are more likely in adulthood.
The interactive specialization viewpoint proposes a middle
ground between the previous two accounts (Johnson 2005).
It proposes that brain regions develop within the context of
other brain regions (embrainment), and that the functional
development of brain regions is shaped in part by interregio-
nal interactions. Specifically, cortical functional brain devel-
opment is characterized by a process of increased tuning,
or selectivity of functions. Thus, the mapping between struc-
tures and functions can and will change during development.
Within this viewpoint, plasticity is retained when a function is
not yet fully specialized.
Functional cortical brain development is best described
as progressive localization and progressive specialization of
function, through competition and cooperation between dis-
tinct areas. Representations that emerge within a region are
constrained by existing representations in functionally neigh-
boring areas, consistent with the interactive specialization
view.
2.3. Embodiment
While the distinction between mind and the physical
world may have surface appeal, ethological work has
revealed a much closer coupling between behavior and
environment. The brain is best viewed as embedded in
its environment, and not divorced from it. As at other
levels of organization, the study of a specific system must
involve consideration of the other systems to which it is
coupled. In the case of the brain, it is unhelpful to
ignore the body and the external environment.
While previous work has distinguished embodiment
(the constraints of the body on the brain) from situated-
ness (the constraints of the environment on the agent),
we use embodiment to encompass both types of inter-
action. Taking embodiment seriously can reveal simpler
solutions to cognitive problems than would be achieved
by nonembodied approaches (e.g., Webb 1994). Indeed,
considering the contribution of both body and environ-
ment can reduce the purported contribution of the
nervous system (Clark 1997). For some cognitive pro-
blems, parts of the solution exist in bodily constraints
and environmental properties. The role of the brain is to
coordinate inner and outer worlds (Ballard et al. 1997).
Hence, representations are not independent from the
environment; rather, they contain partial information
about the environment, sufficient to support contextually
specific behaviors. Representations serve to cause beha-
viors rather than to mirror the environment.
Clark (1997) identifies several important ways in which
an embodied perspective provides benefits to cognitive
research. First, it raises awareness that an important func-
tion for organisms is to harness the environment to their
advantage (Hutchins 1995). Second, the planning and
execution of motor actions must consider body/environ-
ment couplings (Thelen et al. 1996). Third, an embodied
view stresses the online nature of information processing
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002), which relies on context-
dependent heuristics for just-in-time adaptations. Fourth,
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an embodied perspective recognizes how elements of the
environment can act as extensions of the mind, reducing
cognitive load. Fifth, Clark (1997) proposes that language
embeds individuals within society, allowing individuals to
share representations and affect one another’s behavior.
In terms of development, language provides a crucial tool
to guide the experiences of infants and children (Rogoff
1998; Vygotsky 1986).
Embodied models take one of two forms. In agent mod-
eling, both the organism and the environment are computer
simulations (e.g., Schlesinger 2004). Alternatively, research-
ers may use real robots that function in real environments.
An example of this second approach is “Didabot” (Maris &
te Boekhorst 1996), a simple robot that avoids objects per-
ceived by sensors on its left and right sides, near the front.
The robot has a blind spot immediately in front of it. When
several Didabots were placed in an enclosed environment
that contained cubes small enough to fall within the
robots’ blind spots, the cubes ended up in heaps at the
center and periphery of the arena. This apparently
complex “tidying” behavior emerged from the coupling of
a simple mind (avoid obstacles), body (blind spot), and
environment (cubes and other robots).
Developmental embodied cognition focuses on the code-
velopment of the nervous system and the body within a
dynamic environment. This has roots in ecological psy-
chology (e.g., Gibson 1979; 1982). A key concept of this
earlier work is that of affordances, the fact that particular
stimuli invite a specific range of actions in relation to the
agent’s structure and skills. Recent infancy work supports
the notion of action affordance in terms of representing
objects (Mareschal & Bremner 2005; Mareschal &
Johnson 2003). Thelen and Smith (1994) argued more
generally that the interplay between thought and action
is ubiquitous in infancy, consistent with Piaget’s notion
of early sensorimotor development (Piaget 1952). Impor-
tantly, this approach stresses how the child actively manip-
ulates the environment, with dynamic consequences in
respect to the stimulation encountered. Similarly, the
onset of self-locomotion brings about such a major
change in the infant’s effective environment that some
have argued it causes a major reorganization of cognitive
structures (Campos et al. 2000).
2.4. Principles, mechanisms, and processes
A core principle of the neuroconstructivist approach is
context-dependence. At each level of description or analy-
sis, the function of interest depends on the context in
which it is realized. Furthermore, context-dependence is
particularly important for the development of those func-
tions and has significant implications for the represen-
tations that emerge.
Context-dependence constrains emerging represen-
tations through three domain-general, level-independent
mechanisms: cooperation, competition, and chronotopy
(timing). The specific implementation of these mechan-
isms will vary depending on the level of analysis. The
mechanisms themselves make possible two processes
that underlie the development of representations: proac-
tivity and progressive specialization. The outcome of
these processes is the emergence of partial represen-
tations (Fig. 1).
Competition implies that from the many initial contribu-
tors to an immature function, only a subset of these will
ultimately be involved in the mature function. For
example, over time, the expression of gene A may
prevent the expression of gene B. Similarly, inhibitory
neurons or inhibitory brain structures (e.g., frontal lobe
inhibition of subcortical functions) restrict competing pro-
cesses from participating in a particular function. At the
cognitive level, one representation of a sensory input
(e.g., one view of the ambiguous Necker cube) may
compete with another incompatible interpretation of the
same sensory data. Overall, the purpose of competition
is to allow for stable, minimal representations.
Cooperation, however, is a mechanism involved in the
integration of multiple contributors to a function. For
example, some genes serve as triggers for other genes, coac-
tivity of neurons help build circuits, different brain systems
may need to be simultaneously involved in a particular func-
tion, and social behavior requires cooperation among indi-
viduals. Unlike competition, but complementary to it,
cooperation strives for overall efficiency through the coordi-
nation of interrelated functions. Together, competition and
cooperation help build a system that may be minimal but
involves a degree of redundancy that makes it relatively
robust to damage.
The notion of chronotopy stresses that time is a dimension
of development (cf. Elman et al. 1996). Some patterns of gene
expression are restricted to specific developmental times,
some key aspects of neural development rely on sequences
of events, and adaptive plasticity occurs at different times in
different parts of the developing system. At a cognitive
level, this translates to saying that children will solve restricted
problems grounded within a limited domain before solving
abstract general problems that span several domains.
Perhaps the most important temporal aspect concerns
restrictions to plasticity. Neural commitment means that
Figure 1. Principles, mechanisms and processes involved in
the neuroconstructivist framework. Both the mechanisms and
processes can be construed as operating at multiple levels of
description.
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some circuits, once wired, may be hard to alter. Processing
commitment, which is linked to neural commitment, means
that functions become progressively entrenched and selective,
and may lose sensitivity to inputs outside their current range.
Two developmental processes operate on a larger time
scale than the above mechanisms. Proactivity refers to
the idea that, at least in part, representations reflect
internally generated activity. For example, spontaneous
neural activity helps form certain synaptic connections.
Similarly, a child initiates behaviors that have effects on
the environment that, in turn, affect sensory input and
ensuing behavior. We view such a feedback loop, with
key involvement from a proactive child, as the engine of
development. There is substantial evidence that, from an
early age, infants and children are selective about the
information they process from the environment (Cohen
1972; Fantz 1964; Posner 1993). There is also evidence
revealing a role for spontaneously generated movements
on early development (Goldfield et al. 1993; Robertson
et al. 2001), even in utero (Prechtl 2001; Robertson 1988).
The other developmental process is progressive special-
ization. In its simplest form, the state of the system at any
given time places constraints on future states of the
system. Waddington’s (1957) metaphor of an epigenetic
landscape captures the idea well. According to Wadding-
ton, development is like a ball rolling down an uneven
surface, able to take different directions as a function of
its direction and inertia, and the landscape. Typical devel-
opment would see most balls end up in the same general
area of the landscape, and atypical development would
see balls end up in different areas because of changes to
initial direction, inertia, or landscape. A good example of
such restriction-of-fate over time is phonological develop-
ment. Although newborns can distinguish speech sounds
from all human languages, the ability to discriminate non-
native speech sounds drops substantially after about six
months (Stager & Werker 1997; Trehub 1976). Impor-
tantly, progressive specialization does not simply limit
future adaptations but can also facilitate learning. In a con-
structivist framework, early knowledge often provides the
building blocks for further knowledge.
We argue that the outcomes of these developmental pro-
cesses are partial representations. The brain contains mul-
tiple fragmentary and partial representations that are
sufficient to allow successful behavior, for example, in
response to a given object over a range of contexts. Each
of these is able to have an independent causal effect on
behavior. This view is consistent with the distributed proces-
sing that takes place in the brain and is a computationally
efficient solution to representation. New representations
are thus acquired in the context of existing (also fragmen-
tary) representations, the current effective learning environ-
ment, and the current developmental state of the body.
3. Case studies
This section presents different areas of research that serve
to exemplify how our approach can be applied in different
domains. We use the term case study in the broad sense of
a focused illustration. The first four case studies are con-
crete examples of how the mechanisms operate. The last
three cases are concerned with the notion of interactions
between the different levels of explanation.
3.1. Early visual perception
Visual information processing in adults involves distinct cor-
tical regions (Van Essen et al. 1992). For example, during
object recognition, cortical processing begins in area V1
(the primary visual cortex) and progresses through a
series of cortical regions until object identity per se is pro-
cessed in the inferotemporal cortex. This portion of the
visual system dealing with object recognition is known as
the ventral pathway (Ungerleider & Mishkin 1982).
Along this pathway early areas are involved in simpler
tasks such as edge, contrast, or orientation detection (e.g.,
Hubel & Wiesel 1963), whereas later areas are involved
in progressively more abstract representations (such as, ulti-
mately, identifying an object). However, the pathway is not
unidirectional but involves reciprocal connections between
regions (Lamme & Roelfsema 2000). Later processes can
affect earlier ones, such that the dynamics of information
processing are more important than their specific anatom-
ical locations (Felleman & Van Essen 1991). Each cortical
region is embedded in a network of other regions and pro-
cesses information in this dynamic context.
Within each region there exists competition between cells,
such as that occurring through lateral inhibition. This compe-
tition occurs at each stage of processing and reflects both
bottom-up stimulation and top-down biases (Desimone &
Duncan 1995). Cooperation is also an important process in
vision. To identify an object, it is necessary to group features
of the visual input that belong to that object and to segment
those from the background. This is achieved through an
interactive process involving feedforward and feedback con-
nections between the different cortical areas involved in
object perception (Driver et al. 2001). Chronotopy is also
important, as the functionality of the visual system emerges
from a peripheral to central ordering over time (Johnson &
Vecera 1996; Shrager & Johnson 1996). Later-developing
neurons in higher-order areas can exploit the earlier, partial
representations developed in lower, peripheral regions. Rep-
resentations learned at each level constrain the represen-
tational space of subsequent levels, allowing high-order
regularities to be extracted (Clark & Thornton 1997).
The input selectivity of cells involved in visual processing
can be changed through learning (Desimone 1996). More-
over, experience leads to a decrease in the population of
cells that respond to a familiar stimulus (Rainer & Miller
2000). Changes in performance thus reflect changes in rep-
resentations, distributed across a smaller, selective popu-
lation of neurons (Karni et al. 1995). Some work also
reports that the cortical regions involved in a task may
change as a function of expertise (Walsh et al. 1998), with
fewer regions involved after learning than was initially the
case (Petersen et al. 1998). This experience-dependent
selectivity can enhance processing of subsets of visual
inputs at the expense of other subsets. Selective attention
implements a form of proactivity, whereby the child prefer-
entially attends to some stimuli over others.
Overall, cortical regions involved in visual processing
carry out contextualized intraregional competition and
interregional cooperation, modulated by a degree of
chronotopy that forces simpler representations to be
acquired prior to progressively more complex represen-
tations. The progressive specialization at each level of
processing reflects experience, which is proactive. The
outcome is a set of partial representations across a
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complex network of cortical areas that together enable
object recognition.
3.2. Infant habituation
Because of the limited perceptual and motor skills of
infants, researchers have devised many indirect methods
to assess cognitive abilities in infants. The most popular
method is the use of looking-time data (e.g., Thorpe
1956). Over the repeated presentation of stimuli, babies
show a progressive decrease of interest, reflected by
shorter looking times to the stimuli. They are then
deemed to have habituated. However, they can show
renewed interest (assessed from relatively longer
looking) when presented with novel stimuli. This
“novelty preference” is an example of proactive explora-
tion of the environment. By careful manipulation of how
the habitual and novel stimuli differ from each other,
researchers can make claims about what infants perceive
to be distinct, with implications for the nature of their
underlying representations (Cashon & Cohen 2000). A
common approach, owing to the pioneering work of
Sokolov (1963), is to suggest that a mental representation
of the habitual set of stimuli is learned, and that the progress-
ive decrease in looking time reflects an increasing match
between this internal represenataion and the stimuli.
Novelty preference is then taken to reflect a mismatch
between the internal representation and the novel stimulus.
In accordance with our theme of consistency across levels
of interpretation, Sirois and Mareschal (2002) argued that
models and theories of habituation should reflect the two
key neural mechanisms that support infant habituation.
First, the hippocampus is involved in selective inhibition
of high-order features such as color or shape (or feature
relations, such as color-plus-shape) of the habitual stimuli
(Nelson 1995; Sokolov & Vinogradova 1975). Hippocampal
inhibition is short-lived. Hence, given that habituation has
lasting effects (Zelazo et al. 1991), the second neural mech-
anism of habituation involves long-term storage in hippo-
campal-related cortical areas, notably the entorhinal
cortex (Nelson 1995).
In the Habituation, autoassociation and brain (HAB)
model of infant habituation (Sirois & Mareschal 2004), hip-
pocampal and cortical functions are both implemented by
simple autoassociator networks (see Sirois 2004); however,
they use different learning rules to implement selective inhi-
bition and long-term storage. Both networks are coupled
through reciprocal connections and both contribute to the
overall output of the system. Embedding the model in a
robot and an environment illustrated how motor learning
contributes to habituation performance (Sirois 2005).
The HAB model illustrates the main principles of the
neuroconstructivist approach in the following ways. First,
learning is driven by context, as each subsystem learns
within the feedback loop of the other, antagonist subsys-
tem. Moreover, as the robot work illustrated, habituation
can be affected by motor learning. Behavior involves a
mixture of cooperation (within subsystems, but also
between them when their outputs are aggregated at the
system level) and competition (the hippocampus attempts
to shut down known input signals, whereas the cortex
attempts to amplify them). Moreover, chronotopy was
shown by the model’s ability to capture age-related
changes in performance through maturation of outward
connections from the cortex (Sirois & Mareschal 2004),
as observed in infant brains and in absence of prior experi-
ence. The model is proactive, as it seeks maximally stimu-
lating input (Sirois 2005), and exhibits progressive
specialization as it shifts from an initial familiarity prefer-
ence to a novelty preference once known inputs are well
learned. The outcome is partial representations, as the
behavior of the model is achieved through the activity of
several interconnected units in two distinct subsystems.
3.3. Phonological development
Infant babbling, the repetition of simple speech sounds,
creates a coupling between the perception and production
of language. This view is relatively recent, as early work on
phonological development proposed no such connection
between babbling and speech (Jakobson 1941; Lenneberg
1967).
In the first year of life, there are substantial changes to
the perception of speech sounds. The best known is how
infants, who are initially able to discriminate speech
sounds from any human language (Eimas et al. 1971), pro-
gressively lose the ability to discriminate phonemes from
outside their native language in the second half of the
first year (Werker & Tees 1984). The importance of the lin-
guistic environment is further stressed by data showing that
infants’ speech discrimination ability is correlated with the
clarity of their mothers’ speech (Liu et al. 2003).
Changes in speech-sound production can be observed
in infant articulation. Before six months, most speech
sounds consist of isolated vowels. However, around six
months, most infants begin to babble. Articulation
becomes progressively more complex over the next few
months, and babbling becomes more specific to the
infant’s native language (Boysson-Bardies et al. 1989).
This is arguably a key step towards the development of a
phonological inventory, used for words and subsequently
more complex linguistic structures (Vihman 2002).
The central role of auditory perception for babbling has
been emphasized by research on deaf infants (Oller &
Eilers 1988), who babble later than hearing infants and
produce different sounds. These effects are long lasting
and can negatively affect later speech (Wallace et al.
1998). Auditory feedback is thus necessary for the success-
ful coordination of phonatory (larynx) and articulatory
(vocal tract) speech systems, essential for babbling and,
subsequently, speech (Koopmans-van Beinum et al. 2001).
Westermann and Miranda (2004) recently proposed a
mechanistic model of the development of the link
between speech perception and production. The model
consists of two topographic maps, one each for articulation
and perception. Within these maps, neurons responded to
inputs that fell within their respective fields. The two maps
were connected with Hebbian weights, such that units
with high covariation between maps saw their connections
strengthened and connections for units with low covaria-
tion were weakened. As a consequence, strongly covarying
articulations/perceptions became prototypical; these pro-
totypes represented vowels that could be most robustly
produced based on articulatory parameters. The model’s
prototypical speech sounds reflected both internally gen-
erated activity and environmental input (see Vihman
1991 for a similar interpretation called the articulatory
filter hypothesis).
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Context is central to the emergence of speech sound
prototypes in both maps. Articulatory representations
emerge from a dynamic interaction with perception and
vice versa; moreover, these reflect the context of both
internally generated and external inputs. Each topographi-
cal map implements local competition through lateral inhi-
bition, but the coupling of articulation and perception
requires the cooperation of both maps. Chronotopy is
also important, as both maps require a synchronization
of plasticity. Proactivity is vital, as babbling produces the
coupling between perception and production. Moreover,
as this coupling develops, the representations make the
model progressively more selective with respect to
environmental input. In real infants, in a real linguistic
environment, this would lead to enhanced performance
in the native language, at the expense of discrimination
abilities for other languages (see also McClelland et al.
2002). Ultimately, this progressive specialization within
and between maps leads to partial representations:
speech sounds become activations patterns on both
maps, and these cannot be isolated from one another.
3.4. Object representations in infants
Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982) proposed that object pro-
cessing involves two separate cortical information proces-
sing pathways: the dorsal and ventral streams. It was
proposed that the dorsal stream, terminating in the parie-
tal cortex, processes object localization (the where func-
tion), whereas the ventral system, ending in the temporal
cortex, performs object identification (the what function).
The actual degree of independence of these two streams
has recently been the object of some attention (Fellman
& Van Essen 1991; Humphreys & Riddoch 2003;
Merigan & Maunsell 1993; Puce et al. 1998). Our interest,
though, is that both streams process different types of
information and, as such, develop distinct representations.
The fact that object representations are, to a large degree,
segregated in functionally distinct routes, implies that there
needs to be a mechanism that integrates these two sources
of information when they are required by some task (such
as, for example, picking up a specific object from several
alternatives). Mareschal et al. (1999) proposed a model
that examines how these two streams of information may
be gradually integrated over the course of development,
explaining why successful object retrieval by infants lags
behind successful visual tracking. A key assumption of the
model is that both routes (ventral and dorsal) are exposed
to the same input but differ in their associative learning
mechanisms. The object recognition network (ventral
stream) generates a spatially invariant representation of
objects, using an unsupervised competitive learning rule
(Foldiak 1991). The trajectory prediction network (dorsal
stream) uses a partially recurrent feedforward network to
track the immediately anticipated retinal position of
moving objects, a proactive process. The response inte-
gration network in Mareschal et al. (1999) represents a
measure of infants’ abilities to coordinate and use infor-
mation about the positions and identities of objects, analo-
gous to a similar prefrontal cortical function observed in
primates (Rao et al. 1997).
Interestingly, young infants show some unusual beha-
viors when objects are briefly occluded. For instance,
infants can remember spatial properties of occluded
objects but not necessarily identity features (Kaldy &
Sigala 2004; Leslie et al. 1998; Simon et al. 1995; Wilcox
& Schweinle 2002; Xu & Carey 1996). Object individua-
tion at 4.5 months relies on shape and size, at 7.5
months on texture, and only at 11.5 months does it
involve color (Wilcox 1999). Mareschal and Johnson
(2003) examined under which conditions four-month-
olds would retain position or identity information during
a 5-second occlusion. They found that the functional
value of objects (their affordance, in Gibsonian terms)
appears to drive a competition between dorsal and
ventral streams for object retention. Objects that afford
the possibility of actions maintain dorsally processed infor-
mation, whereas objects that do not afford action maintain
ventral information.
This and other evidence highlights the contextual nature
of object processing, involving the child, the environment,
the affordance of objects and functionally distinct neural
representations. Competition and cooperation occur at
different levels in the distributed system involved in
object recognition. The system also exhibits progressive
specialization, in that each stream excludes irrelevant
sources of information (spatial or featural) to carry out
its function. Ultimately, the infant brain must coordinate
partial representations in distinct systems to act on specific
objects (Mareschal et al. 1999; Rao et al. 1997).
3.5. Ensocialment
The importance of the social context on cognitive develop-
ment has a long history (e.g., Bandura 1986; Rogoff 1990;
Vygotsky 1978). Our focus is on the developing child situ-
ated in an environment that includes other humans and in
which development involves a collaboration between the
child and those who support and nurture this development
(Rogoff 2003). While these ideas are not new, it is only
more recently that the importance of social behavior has
made forays into the neurosciences (e.g., Adolphs 2003).
An early aspect of social brain function is the preference
of newborns (as early as within the first hours after birth)
for face-like stimuli (Johnson et al. 1991; Valenza et al.
1996). Although the specific cues that elicit the preference
remain a source of debate (see Johnson 2005 for review), it
has been suggested that three high-contrast blobs in the
positions of the eyes and mouth may be sufficient
(Johnson & Morton 1991; Morton & Johnson 1991).
Hence, the brain does not contain, from birth, a detailed
specification of a face but a skeletal, partial, representation.
The preference for face-like stimulation makes the infant
proactive in seeking stimulation with faces, which places
the infant in a learning context in which other cortical
systems will learn about faces. Hence, an initial bias
ensures that later developing areas of the cortex acquire
specific specialization for faces (Johnson 2005). Similarly,
evidence shows that infants prefer to look at faces that
show direct gaze towards them (Farroni et al. 2002). Main-
taining eye contact with someone ensures foveation of the
face, which may prove essential to the emergence of a cor-
tical face area (Johnson 2004).
Children benefit from “ensocialment” in several other
ways. For example, Vygotsky (1978) was probably the
first to fully recognize the role of language in shaping cog-
nitive development. Vygotsky argued that, cognitive
change involved moving from external speech, which
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instructs the child, to private speech, whereby the child
maintains an internal dialog that takes over from external
instruction to guide behavior. Indeed, Berk and Gavin
(1984) observed that most vocalized private speech in
group settings actually takes place when a child is
working alone on a difficult task.
Vygotsky (1978) further proposed that in relation to the
child’s current level of development, there existed a small
window of optimal stimulation within which to provoke
further development: the zone of proximal development
(ZPD). Infants display this spontaneously by exhibiting a
preference for stimuli that are moderately discrepant from
their current knowledge or capabilities (McCall et al.
1977). Teaching below this zone provides little enhance-
ment as it is within the child’s current grasp. Similarly,
teaching above this zone would also provide few gains as
the child would fail to see the path between her current
level of competence and the teaching. Thus, Rogoff (1990)
proposed the notion of guided participation, whereby pro-
gress is optimal when child and teacher share a focus and
purpose in learning. The main idea in terms of instruction
(and, generally, pedagogy) is that it channels the child’s
interaction with the environment (see also Csibra &
Gergely 2006). The emphasis on joint participation once
again highlights the importance of proactivity from the child.
3.6. Atypical development
In most cases, the outcome of development is relatively pre-
dictable. However, how can we explain variability in devel-
opmental outcome? Some variability is observed in
intelligence, much more in cases of developmental dis-
orders. Developmental disorders can have several causes.
Disorders can stem from genetic abnormalities, such as in
Down syndrome, Williams syndrome, and fragile X. They
can be identified on behavioral grounds, such as in
autism, Specific Language Impairment (SLI), Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and dyslexia. In
these latter cases, some genetic influence is suspected as
these conditions can run in families but the genetic basis
is not fully understood. Finally, disorders can be caused
by atypical environments, either biochemical (e.g.,
mothers taking drugs during pregnancy) or psychological
(e.g., cases of deprivation or abuse). Notably, some develop-
mental disorders can exhibit very uneven cognitive profiles.
For example, there may be particular problems in language
but less so in nonverbal areas (e.g., SLI). Some abilities can
appear relatively stronger against a background of low IQ
(e.g., face recognition in Williams syndrome). How should
we explain these uneven profiles?
Where uneven cognitive profiles are observed in typical
adults who have experienced brain damage, the usual
recourse is to infer that certain parts of the adult cognitive
structure have sustained damage. Some researchers have
attempted to apply this explanatory framework to develop-
mental disorders, inferring that isolated cognitive com-
ponents have failed to develop, while the rest of the
cognitive system has developed typically. Examples
include a Theory of Mind module in autism (Baron-
Cohen 1999; Baron-Cohen et al. 1993) and a syntax
module in SLI (Van der Lely 1997). Where the disorder
has a genetic basis, there has been a further temptation
to view uneven cognitive profiles as evidence for direct
links between genes and particular cognitive mechanisms.
Explaining developmental deficits with reference to the
typical adult cognitive system is, however, problematic.
The adult structure is not prespecified but is itself a
product of development. Yet strong analogies with adult
brain damage produce accounts of developmental deficits
with no role for development at all. In contrast empirical
evidence supports the role of development in producing
atypical cognitive profiles. When Paterson et al. (1999)
explored the language and number abilities of toddlers
with Down syndrome and Williams syndrome, they
found a different relative pattern to that observed in
adults with these disorders. The profile in early childhood
was not a miniature version of the adult profile.
The influence of genetic variation and genetic mutation
on brain development is not yet fully understood.
However, current data suggest that genetic effects are
typically graded and diffuse, and have not been found to
co-occur with the regions of the cortex associated with
specialised higher cognitive functions in typical adults.
For example, the British KE family were initially identified
as having a specific speech and language deficit caused by
mutation to a single gene (FOXP2). However, subsequent
research revealed that there were widespread structural
and functional brain differences in family members pos-
sessing the mutation, while cognitive deficits extended
outside the domain of language to negatively affect, for
example, performance on nonverbal, rapid associative
learning tasks (Watkins et al. 2002a; Watkins et al.
2002b). In a comparison of a number of genetic syn-
dromes, Kaufmann and Moser (2000) confirmed that
diffuse effects on brain development are the norm.
The neuroconstructivist approach places the developmen-
tal process at the heart of explanations of developmental dis-
orders (Karmiloff-Smith 1998a). Empirically, the framework
encourages researchers to focus on trajectories of develop-
ment rather than static snapshots. Theoretically, disorders
are viewed as cases of atypically constrained trajectories. A
disordered system is still adaptive, yet it may not possess
the neurocomputational constraints that are appropriate to
acquire a domain. In some circumstances, apparently
typical behaviors may be generated by atypical underlying
processes (see, e.g., Deruelle et al. 1999; Karmiloff-Smith
et al. 2004, for work on face recognition in Williams syn-
drome). In other cases, the atypical constraints may
produce better than typical performance in a domain, such
as in some aspects of perception in autism. In Waddington’s
(1957) metaphor, the epigenetic landscape has changed.
Several of the core ideas of neuroconstructivism are
emphasized by the study of atypical development. For
example, in some cases interactive specialization of corti-
cal areas appears atypical. Adults with Williams syndrome
exhibit face recognition skills in the normal range, but
examination of ERPs reveal reduced evidence of specializ-
ation and localization of neural activity (e.g., Grice et al.
2001). Neuroimaging data have suggested differences in
the constraints of chronotypy, in terms of the changes in
connectivity (and associated plasticity) over time in dis-
orders such as autism and Down syndrome (e.g., Becker
et al. 1986; Chugani et al. 1999).
Differences in input encoding have been proposed to
have cascading effects on the context in which other cogni-
tive abilities are acquired (e.g., in autism, SLI, and dys-
lexia). Alterations in the level of abstraction achieved in
forming internal representations, or in the dimensions of
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similarity that those representations encode, can play a
material role in the ability of other brain systems to
employ this information to drive other processes. It is
possible that in autism, SLI, and dyslexia, for example,
the consequence of atypical similarity structure in the
input representations results in a processing deficit
much higher up in a hierarchy of representational
systems. Differences in embodiment may also impact on
the trajectory of development. For example, Sieratzki
and Woll (1998) proposed that in children with spinal
muscular atrophy, a disorder that reduces early mobility,
language development might be accelerated as a compen-
satory way for the young child to control their environ-
ment. Lastly, an atypical child co-specifies an atypical
social environment, for example, in the expectations and
reactions of parents and peers, which has also been
observed to influence these children’s development.
Of course, when we place an emphasis on development
as a trajectory, and atypical development as an atypically
constrained trajectory, it becomes increasingly important
to specify what is different about the constraints and mech-
anisms of change. Here computational modeling has offered
exciting avenues for progress in the study of disorders (e.g.,
disorders of infant gaze perception: Triesch et al. 2006;
disorders of language: Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2003).
3.7. Dyslexia
Reading is a relatively recent human invention, going back
only a few thousand years. It is highly unlikely that evol-
ution has produced domain-specific constraints on the
cognitive systems involved (McCandliss et al. 2003). The
existence of a specialised reading system in a brain must
therefore represent an adaptation of more general func-
tions to reflect the specific environmental demands of cul-
tures that encourage expertise in this area.
Neuroimaging suggests that reading recruits up to a
dozen distinct brain areas (Dehaene 2003). One particular
area, the visual word form area, shows comparably high
levels of activity for words and pseudowords (seemingly
plausible nonwords made up of standard letters), but not
for illegal letter symbols, suggesting an area that processes
visual stimuli that look like words, prior to establishing
whether they have a meaning (Dehaene et al. 2002;
Posner et al. 1988). The location of this area is relatively
consistent across individuals and languages (and thus
scripts). Because it couldn’t have been selected by evol-
ution, this area must be one that happens to have appro-
priate computational properties for processing words;
that is, fine foveal discrimination and invariant recognition
of letter- and word-sized stimuli (McCandliss et al. 2003).
The emergence of reading requires a mapping to be
established between the linguistic phonological discrimi-
nations of the preliterate child and the letters or letter clus-
ters he or she must learn: That is, the child must learn the
relation between graphemes (new) and phonemes (old).
Some languages, such as English and French, have incon-
sistent mappings between graphemes and phonemes (e.g.,
the letter ‘i’ sounds different in the English words bit and
bite). Compared to languages with consistent mappings
(e.g., Italian and Spanish), inconsistent mappings can
delay proficient grapheme-phoneme decoding by up to
two years (Goswami 2002; 2003).
Reading disabilities in English affect 5 to 17 percent of
school-aged children (Shaywitz & Shaywitz 1994). Two
main subtypes of developmental dyslexia have been pro-
posed (Castles & Coltheart, 1993; Manis et al. 1996). Phono-
logical developmental dyslexia involves difficulties reading
novel or pseudowords, whereas surface developmental dys-
lexia describes a difficulty in reading irregular words for
which the pronunciation cannot be predicted from the
sounds of the individual letters (words such as aisle or yacht).
Twin studies have suggested a significant genetic contri-
bution to developmental dyslexia (Pennington 1999;
Plomin & Dale 2000; Plomin & Rutter 1998). However,
a direct mapping of gene to cognitive function is highly
unlikely. Therefore, one might expect to observe more
widespread effects than dyslexia alone if there is a
genetic aetiology. Although there is no consensus and sub-
stantial variability in the literature, especially for surface
dyslexia, various concurrent cognitive deficits have been
observed in individuals with dyslexia, suggesting a more
general sensorimotor syndrome (Stein & Walsh 1997).
Most computational models of typical and atypical
reading development assume that the domain problem
constitutes learning to map between the representational
codes for written words, spoken words, and word mean-
ings (e.g., Harm & Seidenberg 2004; Plaut et al. 1996; Sei-
denberg & McClelland 1989). Surface dyslexia has been
simulated by altering the initial computational constraints
so that the system’s ability to learn the mapping between
orthography and phonology is reduced. (Sometimes this
involves impairing a putative route to pronunciation via
word meaning.) Phonological dyslexia has been simulated
in two majors ways. The first method is to degrade the prop-
erties of the phonological representations (e.g., Harm &
Seidenberg 2004). The second method degrades the
ability of the system to learn the functional linking orthogra-
phy and phonology. It is notable that, in this account,
similar manipulations can produce symptoms of either
surface or phonological dyslexia; many people with dyslexia
also show symptoms of both types (Manis et al. 1996).
Developmental dyslexia serves to illustrate the prin-
ciples of neuroconstructivism in the following ways.
Reading is a specialisation of a more general system,
reflecting the context of a particular environment. In
typical development, reading involves dynamic inter-
actions between multiple functions with suitable compu-
tational properties. Partial representations interact
during development, as highlighted by the restructuring
of phonology when the mapping to graphemes is
learned. In developmental dyslexia, the somewhat hetero-
geneous clusters of difficulties reflect the different ways
crucial mappings between phonology, orthography, and
semantics can be disrupted, as illustrated by compu-
tational work. This is consistent with the suggestion of a
genetic aetiology, which would be unlikely to selectively
disrupt a function that evolution cannot have selected in
the first place. Rather, genetic anomalies are expected to
show more general, diffuse effects with differential
rather than specific consequences in particular domains.
4. Conclusions
Our framework has many implications for developmental
theory. One major implication is that our proposal of
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multilevel isomorphism is a radical rejection of Marr
(1982). Cognition cannot be studied independently of
the brain and body. Another important implication is the
central role of developmental trajectories in the interpret-
ation of adult cognition. There is no teleology involved in
development; mature, normative cognition is an outcome
of development, not a pre-specified target (Thomas & Kar-
miloff-Smith 2003).
We have also argued that brain regions do not utilize
complete representations. In support of this view, we dis-
cussed, first, how a particular input signal is typically pro-
cessed separately along distinct dimensions (e.g., shape,
color, motion in object perception), and second, that func-
tional brain systems are interrelated with other functional
systems, and are located and within a body and an environ-
ment. All these contexts provide varying levels and sources
of information such that only fragments of information
need to be represented. An implication is that cognition
will be compositional and systematic (e.g., Fodor 1975;
Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988) only if the context permits it.
Progressive specialization, and notions such as emer-
gent modularity (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith 1998a) imply that,
as a result of development, the cognitive architecture
will exhibit a progressive lack of flexibility to the novel.
This can be observed when emergent specialized
systems have well-delineated functions (Johnson & Muna-
kata 2005). These specialized systems should not be con-
strued as mere imprinting from environmental pressures
and regularities. The child, from birth (e.g., Robertson
et al. 2004), is an active contributor to his or her develop-
ment. Our emphasis on context-dependence may be taken
as implying that it is impossible to make general claims
about cognition. This is not the case. Instead, we argue
that the key to understanding contextualised function is
to identify those contexts that are central to the function
of interest, while ignoring those contexts that may have a
peripheral rather than central role in determining the
function of interest.
A recurrent theme in our book is the need for causal
theories regarding what makes complex behaviors
emerge. These theories need to explain behaviors on
multiple time scales. They must explain how and why
behaviors unfold as we observe them in real time, as
well as how they unfold in developmental time. To do
this, we need more than just a very detailed description
of the behaviors that can be observed at any point. Cer-
tainly, such descriptions are essential for the advance-
ment of causal theories of development, but they are
unsatisfactory to the extent that they are unable to
explain or predict new behaviors. The clearest example
of this is with regards to explaining the behavior of chil-
dren with developmental disorders. Unless one has a
mechanistic theory of what is causing behaviors to
unfold, and a causal theory of what is atypical in such
children’s processing, it is impossible to explain or
predict why one set of atypically developing children
may show a delay at one behavior and excel at another,
while a second set of atypically developing children will
excel at the former behavior but have a developmental
delay in the latter behavior.
In the companion volume, Neuroconstructivism,
volume2: Perspectives and Prospects (Mareschal et al.
2007b), we invited nine research labs with objectives
broadly consistent with the neuroconstructivist approach
to present their computational modeling work. The ques-
tions the models are built to investigate differ both in the
level of description and in time scale over which the rel-
evant behaviors operate. Some models focus on relatively
rapid adaptation occurring (perhaps) at the cellular level
of description, whereas other models focus on relatively
slow adaptation occurring at the cognitive level.
We asked all contributors to the companion volume to
emphasize the following aspects of their contributions
when describing their work:
What functional brain constraints operate on the process
of representation development?
What embodiment or situatedness constraints operate on
the process of representation development?
Ultimately, computational models are tools to help us
reflect on questions of process and mechanisms. There-
fore, we also asked the contributing authors to answer
the following questions:
How does the model embody these constraints?
What concrete predictions does the model make?
In Neurocontructivism, volume 1: How the brain con-
structs cognition, we set out to investigate how the rep-
resentations that underlie cognition emerge in the brain
during development. We argued that the emergence of
such representations is the outcome of a constructivist
process involving constraints that operate at all levels
from the cellular environment to the social environment.
To truly understand how these representations emerge, it
is necessary to locate our theories at the point where the
constraints of brain, body, and environment come together.
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Abstract: I offer a simple method for further investigating the Interactive
Specialization framework, and some data that may or may not be
compatible with the approach, depending on the precise meaning of
“specialization.” Findings from my lab indicate that, while networks of
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Figure 1 (Anderson). Cortex represented as adjacencyþ co-activation graphs. Here the Brodmann areas are nodes, with black lines
between adjacent areas and gray lines between areas showing significant coactivation. The graph on the left shows coactivations from 56
action tasks, and the graph on the right shows coactivations from 77 attention tasks. Graphs rendered with aiSee v. 2.2.
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Figure 1 (Anderson). Continued.
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brain areas cooperate in specialized ways to support cognitive functions,
individual brain areas participate in many such networks, in different
cognitive domains.
Much as I would love to have the time and space to comment
more fully on this fascinating and comprehensive book – for
example, the issues of embodied cognition in general, and embo-
died representations in particular, are topics near and dear to my
heart – I will conform to the BBS mold and comment on only the
one aspect of the book that is most relevant to my most recent
work: the framework of Interactive Specialization (IS). In what
follows I will offer: (1) a method for investigating this framework,
and (2) some data that may or may not be consistent with it
(depending on what is meant by “specialization”).
In contrast to localization-based approaches, which at the
extreme tend to expect a 1 : 1 correspondence between cognitive
functions and brain areas, the IS framework in Neuroconstructi-
vism, Vol. 1: How the Brain Constructs Cognition (Mareschal
et al. 2007a), treats cognitive functions as the “emergent
product of interactions between different brain regions” (p.
60). For IS, the targets of functional brain mapping should be
collections of cooperating neural circuits, not individual brain
areas; and the focus of developmental neuroscience should be
on changes in interregional connectivity, rather than on the
maturation of individual regions.
I wholeheartedly applaud this shift in focus. Networks of
cooperating brain regions are prima facie far more plausible
targets of (high-level) functional attributions than are individual
areas, so much so that I find it something of a puzzle that there
hasn’t been far more effort along these lines (which is not to
imply that there has been none). I think one reason is that
the techniques typically used in cooperation-focused investi-
gations are complex, they are hard to master, and they
produce results that can be difficult to interpret. Thus I
would like to take a moment to outline a very simple analytical
technique we have been using in my lab (Anderson et al.,
in press).
The technique involves the simple expedient of choosing a
spatial segmentation of the cortex (current analyses use Brod-
mann areas, but any consistent segmentation scheme will
work) and analyzing large numbers of fMRI studies in some
specific cognitive or behavioral domain to identify statistically
significant instances of coactivation. We recently compiled a
database of fMRI studies containing 530 experiments in 18
cognitive domains, with the results of each experiment
coded primarily in terms of which Brodmann areas contained
post-subtraction activation(s). The baseline chance of acti-
vation for each area is determined by dividing the number
of experiments in which it was activated by the total
number of experiments in the database. Then, for each pair
of Brodmann areas, we use a chi-square measure to see if
their observed degree of coactivation (in a given domain)
was significantly different from what would be predicted by
chance. With these coactivated pairs, we also perform a bino-
mial analysis to obtain directional information. (It is some-
times the case that, while area A and area B are coactive
more (or less) often than would be predicted by chance,
the effect is asymmetric, such that area B is more active
when area A is active, but not the reverse.)
The results of such analyses are conveniently represented as a
graph, where the nodes are Brodmann areas, and edges between
the nodes indicate significant coactivation. Figure 1 shows the
graphs from one such analysis, for a set of action and attention
tasks. We hypothesize that the network of coactivated
areas revealed by such analysis represent those areas of the
cortex that cooperate to perform the cognitive tasks in the
given domain.
With the data in this format, it becomes possible to formu-
late some very simple questions, and use some well-understood
methods to answer them. For instance, in graph theory a
clique is a set of fully interconnected nodes that are sparsely
connected to the rest of the graph (Alba 1973). Neural
cliques, which in this context represent small networks of coac-
tive areas operating independently of other parts of the graph,
seem likely to correspond to the neural components that
support a set of closely related cognitive functions or subfunc-
tions. One can also look at other features of the graphs, such as
local topography, to help make plausible inferences about
underlying function. For example, a hub-and-spoke pattern of
coactivation may indicate broadcast or information consolida-
tion functions; in contrast long strings of connected nodes
might indicate serial processing. Since one can also look at
the emergence of such structures over time, this seems an
ideal tool for investigating the IS framework. The basic data
for such investigations will become increasingly available as
results from more longitudinal fMRI studies are released.
More generally, I think that graph theory is an underutilized
tool in cognitive neuroscience, and coactivation graphs in par-
ticular offer the promise of making cooperation-sensitive inves-
tigations into neural function more broadly intelligible.
This brings me to some promised data. We generated coac-
tivation graphs in eight cognitive domains (action; attention;
emotion; language; memory; mental imagery; reasoning; visual
perception) from 472 experiments in our database and evalu-
ated how much edge overlap and how much node overlap
there was among the various domains. In this context, node
overlaps indicate Brodmann areas that support tasks in both
domains, whereas edge overlaps indicate similar patterns of
cooperation. Given the focus on the developmental emergence
of networks of brain areas to generate cognitive functions, the
IS framework would seem to predict little edge overlap, as
differences in function would presumably result from differ-
ences in interregional cooperation. This is just what we
found; using Dice’s coefficient as our measure (D ¼ 2(o1,2)/
(n1þ n2), where o is the number of overlapping elements,
and n is the total number of elements in each set) we found
very little edge overlap between the domains (Mean(D) ¼
0.15, SD 0.04). However, we found a great deal of node
overlap (Mean(D) ¼ 0.81, SD 0.04). It is not clear if the IS
framework is compatible with this latter finding, because
Mareschal et al. do not distinguish between increasing compu-
tational specialization in development (whereby a given region
comes to have an increasingly well-defined subfunctional role
in the networks in which it participates) and domain specializ-
ation (whereby increasing specialization of functional networks
also implies increasing dedication of participating regions to a
narrow and domain-restricted range of cognitive functions).
The result reported is just one among a number of findings
that suggests that brain regions are not domain specialized
entities, but in fact typically support functions across many
different cognitive domains (Anderson 2007a; 2007b; 2007c).
I would welcome the authors’ comments and clarifications on
this issue.
A good approach to neural and behavioural
development but would be even better if set in
a broader context
doi:10.1017/S0140525X08004093
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Abstract: An attractive feature of Neuroconstructivism, Vol. I: How the
Brain Constructs Cognition is its emphasis on the active role of the
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individual in neural and behavioural development and the importance of
the interplay with the environment. Certain aspects of development are
omitted, however, such as specializations for the distinctive ecologies of
infancy and childhood and the scaffolding-like features of behaviour
seen during development. It was also a pity that so little credit was
given to many scientists who have contributed to just those aspects of
development on which the authors focus.
A quiet revolution has been taking place in the thinking about the
development of the nervous system and behaviour. Only 30 years
ago E.O. Wilson (1976) felt able to write that development was a
“module” that could be decoupled when correlating differences
in genomes with differences in the adult phenotypes. Few
would agree with that view nowadays. The objective to discover
the relative importance of genes and the environment at the
population level has a distinctly old-fashioned feel about it
now, based as the approach is on the assumption that sources
of variation add together. “Systems analysis” is the phrase on
everybody’s lips, although this particular fashion has rarely
been translated into an understanding of process. What we
need is a coherent way of rendering usable the intuition about
the interplay between the developing organism and its environ-
ment. The two volumes, of which I shall focus on the first
(Mareschal et al. 2007a), represent a serious attempt to provide
such a road map.
Setting out their stall in the first volume, Mareschal et al. argue
that the challenge is to incorporate information from the brain
when explaining the development of behaviour without lapsing
into reductionism. Quite right. As Robert Hinde put it many
times, we have to cross and recross the boundaries between
the different levels of analysis (Bateson 1991). The case
Mareschal et al. make for some degree of formalization is that
an explicit working model brings with it mental discipline and
may expose easily missed weaknesses in a verbal argument.
Such models can also serve several other valuable functions.
They can show how we are easily misled by the dynamics of
development into supposing that the processes are so compli-
cated that they are beyond comprehension. From the point of
future empirical research, they can suggest profitable new lines
of enquiry. Finally, they bear directly on the general arguments
about the interplay between internal and external factors. As
far as linking levels of analysis is concerned, the models point
to the parameters that are features of the organism as opposed
to ones that might be manipulated externally by experiment.
One example is the constant affecting the rate at which plastic
changes occur. These hypothetical features of the organism, if
real, must have some correspondence to underlying neural
mechanisms.
Mareschal et al. emphasize the active role of the individual in
its own development and pick out three principles which they
regard as crucial: cooperation between different systems, compe-
tition, and chronotopy (by which they mean relative temporal
ordering of expression). Competition is defined as the process
by which one of several components wins out and becomes the
relevant functional unit. Despite the high level of abstraction, I
believe that they are generally correct in much of what they
argue for, although I think competition has an additional side
to it. By the process of competitive exclusion, experience of
one kind can shut out the effects of subsequent experiences of
another kind – very important in terminating sensitive periods
in development.
Other important features of development are also left out of
the authors’ analysis. First, many manifestations of the young
individual’s brain and behaviour represent specializations to
the particular ecological conditions of that stage of development;
suckling by young mammals is one well-analysed case. Second,
while I applaud the authors’ emphasis on the active role of the
individual, they do not draw attention to the scaffolding-like char-
acter of many instances of such behaviour; as in the assembly of a
tall building, the scaffolding can be dismantled once the structure
is in place. Third, the conditional responses to local
circumstances mean that, viewed globally, phenotypic
characteristics of adults can be extremely variable, but in each
case well adapted to the particular conditions of the local
environment –unless the individual has been “misinformed” by
the events that initially triggered its developmental trajectory in
early life (Bateson et al. 2004). Finally, despite all their plasticity,
many aspects of fully developed individuals are highly robust and
their development across the population is seemingly impervious
to great differences in experience of individuals. We need
theories of how and why.
The authors are rather more impressed with their own sense of
originality than is really justified. I suspect that I will not be alone
in being irritated by some of their claims that their approach is so
novel. Many distinguished neuroscientists, behavioural biol-
ogists, and developmental psychobiologists who have made
major contributions to the understanding of development have
seemingly been air-brushed out of the picture. So for example,
no references are given to the work of Andrew, Blakemore,
Fentress, Gray, Griffiths, Hinde, Johnston, Konishi, Lehrman,
Marler, Michel, Moore, Nottebohm, Rosenblatt, Schneirla,
Oyama, Trevarthen, Rogers, Rose, and many other important
figures who have shaped understanding of behavioural develop-
ment. When it comes to behavioural imprinting, Gabriel Horn is
mentioned but nothing is stated about his long-term collabor-
ation with me or about the neural net model we developed
together (Bateson & Horn 1994). This model was developed
with precisely the same objectives as those stated by the
authors of the first volume, namely aiming to provide an
account that was plausible at both the behavioural and neural
levels. We set out many important implications for development.
A general characteristic of our three-layered, unsupervised
model was that it exhibited a well-known feature of development,
simulating the competitive exclusion process that generates a
descriptive sensitive period. While tending to settle into familiar
habits, it was also able to build with increasing elaboration on the
basis of previous perceptual experience. It was able to classify
together different views of the same object and simulated well
the perceptual learning process by which low stimulus value
cues become more salient as a result of being paired with high
stimulus value cues.
The authors argue admirably for a multidisciplined approach
to the study of brain and behavioural development. It is pity,
therefore, that they have seemed to settle into a silo of their
own making and have not drawn more explicitly on many of
the important conceptual and empirical advances in subjects
close to their own. It shows how much more dialogue is necessary
if the cooperation needed for the enterprise in which they are
engaged is to proceed satisfactorily in the future.
Unimodal experience constrains while
multisensory experiences enrich cognitive
construction
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Abstract: Mareschal and his colleagues argue that cognition consists of
partial representations emerging from organismic constraints placed on
information processing through development. However, any notion of
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constraints must consider multiple sensory modalities, and their gradual
integration across development. Multisensory integration constitutes
one important way in which developmental constraints may lead to
enriched representations that serve more than immediate behavioural
goals.
Neuroconstructivism, Vol. 1: How the Brain Constructs Cogni-
tion (Mareschal et al. 2007) makes a persuasive argument that
we should use computational modeling tools to attempt to under-
stand the processes of change in those neural structures that
underlie cognitive development. The authors argue that model-
ing can help researchers understand the constraints acting on
experience (and thus neural development) at multiple levels,
with particular emphasis placed on the constraints of the
nervous system and the body. The consideration of these mul-
tiple levels of constraint represents an important step forward,
as it provides a more formal conceptualization not just of the
causal processes of change in cognitive development, but also
of how cognitive processes in the mature adult are constrained
by developmental trajectories (see also Westermann et al. 2006).
This approach pays homage to both cognitive neuroscience
and to Piaget. Cognitive development is considered on a neural
and functional neural systems level (and indeed is explained as
arising from causal interactions between these systems). In
homage to Piaget, the authors’ approach asserts that children
proactively construct their own representations by means of
internally generated learning processes. However, when we con-
sider the nature of our internal representations of the
world – the contents of cognition – there is a key point of diver-
gence with Piaget. For while Piaget (1952) was concerned with
the question of how infants and children construct objective (or
in Mareschal et al.’s terms, complete) representations of the
world, the authors of Neuroconstructivism argue that partial rep-
resentations form the substrate of cognition, both during early
development and in mature adults. Mareschal et al. describe
partial representations as “just sufficient to allow successful beha-
vior,” (p. 16) and they justify this view of cognition on the basis
that it is a by-product of learning to achieve a behavioural goal
within a system possessing particular neural and embodiment
constraints.
However, Mareschal and colleagues’ formulation of con-
straints is somewhat limited. In particular, the authors neglect
to consider the critical role of multiple interacting sensory mod-
alities in development. While the authors present a number of
models of learning that take different modalities as their inputs
(visual, auditory, etc.), none of the models process inputs from
more than one sensory modality at any given time. It should be
remembered that the interaction of multiple sensory modalities
was a key aspect of Piaget’s constructionism. More specifically,
Piaget argued that the initial steps toward objectivity in infants’
representations of their world were achieved in part through
the integration of separate, modality-specific schemas (Piaget
1953). In the following observation, Piaget notes what he
termed the “organisation of reciprocal assimilation,” when, for
the first time, his 4-month-old daughter watches herself grasping
an object:
Observation 68. – At 0;4 (9) Lucienne makes no motion to grasp a
rattle she is looking at. But then she subsequently brings to her
mouth the rattle she has grasped independently of sight and sees the
hand which holds the object, her visual attention results in immobiliz-
ing the movement of her hands; however, her mouth was already open
to receive the rattle which is 1 cm away from her. Then Lucienne sucks
the rattle, takes it out of her mouth, looks at it, sucks again, and so on.
(Piaget 1953, pp. 102–103)
Piaget goes on to describe this as a new kind of schema within
which infants can grasp what they see, and see what they grasp: a
reciprocal relationship. For Lucienne, the object is no longer the
thing of looking, nor the thing of grasping, but an entity existing
in a more objective representation. Regardless of the reliability of
Piaget’s observations, his conception of a reciprocal schema
shows us how two initially modality-specific (partial) represen-
tations of the environment (in this case, two unimodal schemas
for acting on the rattle) can be enriched almost fortuitously by
virtue of the spatial and temporal coincidence of the modalities.
The resulting multisensory representation of the object, while
still partial, is enriched and more objective since it goes beyond
the immediate behavioural goal of either of the actions being
performed.
If Mareschal et al.’s approach is to fully describe the nature of
emergent cognitive abilities, then the multisensory constraints of
the developing organism will certainly need further consider-
ation. In particular, computational and robotic models of both
modality-specific constraints (in neural machinery, and the inter-
face of that machinery with the environment via the body) and
also the constraints acting on the integration of these systems
will help to further our understanding of how representations
of the environment emerge.
Piaget’s concept of a reciprocal schema prompts us to consider
research demonstrating a gradual integration of action systems in
early life, as this may point toward the development of mental
representations or schemas that go beyond the simple satisfaction
of an immediate goal. While much multisensory infancy research
points toward the early unification of the senses enabling infants
to detect a large array of amodal relations (Bahrick et al. 2004;
Gibson 1969; Lewkowicz 2000; Phillips-Silver & Trainor 2005),
research addressing crossmodal spatial orienting responses in
infants appears to indicate a more prolonged period of inte-
gration (e.g., Bremner et al. 2008; Neil et al. 2006; von Hofsten
2004). It is possible that the gradual integration of such multisen-
sory action systems may, by going beyond the immediate beha-
vioural goals of initially separate unimodal schemas, enrich the
representations that human infants acquire in the first months
of life, and indeed determine the nature of cognition in
adulthood.
Constructing minds: The development of
mindreading abilities in typical and atypical
trajectories
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Abstract: From our deep interest in the neuroconstructivist framework,
we would like to comment on two fundamental aspects of Mareschal
et al.’s work: the role of neuroconstructivism for clinical work with
people suffering from developmental disorders; and the relation
between the process of progressive specialization and the increasing
abstraction of representations in development.
Mareschal et al. (2007a) consider two fundamental aims in the
study of developmental disorders: “to identify appropriate
methods of remediation” and “to use disorders to help our under-
standing of the normal processes of development” (p. 160). The
authors broadly develop this second aim, showing that atypical
development permits the study of developmental processes in
situations with different constraints (even if assumptions must
be cautious because atypical development is not necessarily a
window to normal development: Karmiloff-Smith 1998b).
However, they do not extend their first aim. We understand
their work does not have a clinical orientation, but we consider
the development of the implications of neuroconstructivism fun-
damental for the implementation of intervention programs aimed
at improving psychological functioning in people with cognitive
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difficulties. Only by tracing the atypical trajectory of a process
from the beginning is it possible to try and remediate cognitive
deficits by emphasizing developmental strengths from as early
as possible (even before behavioral deficits are evident).
Frequently, intervention is solely based on behavioral
measures, without considering the possibility that a similar beha-
vior may rely on different processes. In some cases, discovering
these underlying processes should be the main objective of reme-
diation because the generalization and adaptability of behavior
may only be guaranteed if we use them as the basis for interven-
tion. In our opinion neuroconstructivism’s radical rejection of
Marr’s levels could be extended to the need to consider more
than just the behavioral level in the design, implementation
and evaluation of intervention programs.
In addition, neuroconstructivism’s opposition to the matura-
tional and modular approaches of development can be argued
not only from its theoretical consequences, but also from its
effect on clinical decisions, specifically on the futility of interven-
ing in those domains that are considered preserved. For instance,
Williams syndrome (WS)’s uneven cognitive profile may seem to
support modular perspectives that describe preserved linguistic
and social abilities and therefore, from these approaches,
intervention in these domains is considered unnecessary.
However, evidence has shown that language and social under-
standing abilities are far from intact in WS (Karmiloff-Smith
et al.1997; Sotillo et al. 2007). Since diagnosis is obtained early
on, it is essential to intervene in these and other areas as soon
as possible.
In developmental disorders, atypical functioning of onto-
genetic processes is expected. Mareschal et al. establish two
driving forces in development: proactivity and progressive
specialization. However, they say progressive specialization
“does not seem to be the whole story” (p. 213; emphasis ours)
because representations also go through a process of progressive
abstraction. The “tension” authors find between the processes of
specialization and explicitation is evident, but it is still necessary
to explain their coherence, both within and between different
functions.
One possibility is that each process has a different influence on
diverse cognitive functions. Rivie`re (2003) proposes a Vygotskian
based taxonomy of four initially hierarchical and cumulative
psychological functions: F1 or modular unspecific (e.g., bright-
ness perception), F2 or constructive nonsocial unspecific (e.g.,
object permanence), F3 or rudimentary-higher (e.g., language)
and F4 or proper-high-functions (e.g., multiplication). Set on a
continuum, F1 would be highly modular, associated with a
precise neural localization, inflexible, and very efficient; while
F4 would depend completely on culture and require explicit
instruction. Development of F1 and F2 would lean fundamen-
tally on specialization processes beginning as automatic in F1,
and progressively becoming more dependent on experience in
F2 and F3 (already being specifically human and dependant on
social interaction). Development of each psychological function
would rest differently on each developmental process, although
both are necessary; and their coherence is particularly relevant
in cognitive functions that imply redescription but also permit
progressive specialization.
Representations specialize by getting more efficient and
context dependent. However, context sometimes does not offer
sufficient clues. It is not stable, and therefore explicit represen-
tations are also necessary for a systematic and compositional cog-
nition. Implicit, embodied representations remain available
when automatic, efficient functioning is required, but explicit
representations permit independence from context, conscious
reasoning and interrepresentational relations (Karmiloff-Smith
1992). Abstraction will be greater in higher functions, which
require social interaction in such a way that explicitation needs
not only internally but also externally generated social activity.
F3 (as theory of mind –ToM) are just in the vertex of biology
and culture, and allow approaching the role of ensocialment,
embrainment, and embodiment in typical and atypical
development.
People with WS are truly motivated to maintain social relation-
ships and are rather capable of recognizing emotions. Neverthe-
less, from the assumption of an atypical developmental trajectory
from the beginning at multiple levels, it does not seem viable to
describe a preserved ToM module, or even submodule (Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan 2000). Instead an atypical trajectory in
developmental processes is predictable.
The influence of specialization and explicitation on the devel-
opment of ToM abilities in WS children has been analyzed in our
lab (Campos, in preparation), and the results showed a lower per-
formance in ToM than expected from their mental age. Further-
more, development of explicitation competences of mental states
appeared particularly delayed in this group. Consistent with
Karmiloff-Smith’s (2006) predictions for atypical development,
the processes of specialization and explicitation seem affected
in WS in the social domain.
Research results are essential for intervention. If implicit pro-
cessing abilities are better in WS, it is then possible to use an
implicit approach in a clinical setting. Diverse developmental tra-
jectories should imply different ways of remediation. Interven-
tion with people with autism usually implies teaching some F3
as if they were F4, by explicit instruction (Howlin et al. 1999).
However, in WS it could be more efficient to intervene based
on their strong points: intersubjetivity and empathy, and to use
their genuine interest to establish social relationships to
provide them with social strategies for understanding mental
states.
The neuroconstructivist perspective has an interesting poten-
tial, and we consider it crucial to extend its implications to clinical
intervention, in order to improve the quality of life for people
with developmental disorders. Research on optimal clinical strat-
egies in different developmental situations will also have theoreti-
cal implications for the study of ontogenetic mechanisms. To
achieve this, Rivie`re’s taxonomy of functions could be a useful
tool in that proactivity and progressive specialization would not
need to be “the whole story,” as they both would play their
own part in every psychological function.
The concept of coregulation between
neurobehavioral subsystems: The logic
interplay between excitatory and inhibitory
ends
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Abstract: Neuroconstructivism, Vol. 1: How the Brain Constructs
Cognition implies that brain functioning depends on biofeedback and
ecological trajectories. Using the building blocks of Boolean algebra
known as logic gates and models of distributed control systems, I
suggest that levels of regulatory states are responsible for optimal,
pathological, and developmental processes. I include the impact of
regulatory and nonregulatory functions on structural development.
Mareschal et al. (2007a) is a breakthrough in that it unifies many
diverse approaches, each of which gives a partial explanation for
brain functionality, into a more complete and modern interpret-
ation. Building blocks of Boolean algebra known as logic gates
and models of distributed control systems can serve as elucida-
tion for levels of regulatory states that are responsible for
optimal, pathological, and developmental processes as they
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manifest themselves in regulatory and nonregulatory functions to
impact structural development.
The immediate implications are: (1) The complexity of feed-
back mechanisms between all the systems involved is more
than earlier assumed, and (2) The optimal functioning of devel-
opment is dependent on regulatory and nonregulatory states of
the brain working within the body and the environment.
Regulation was defined earlier as the ability of the organism to
return to baseline after mounting specific responses to an environ-
mental stimulus. Neurobehavioral coregulation is defined as the
capacity of the organism to subordinate all neurobehavioral
capacities to enhance learning that allows it to be adaptive to the
environmental requirements. It is also defined as the capacity of
the organism to return to balance, following the adaptation of
the enhanced neurobehavioral subsystem to the environmental
stimulus. These processes support the successive maturation of
all neurobehavioral subsystems, while working together and in
competition with each other, towards a coordinated balance by
increasing or decreasing responses to each other’s state.
The importance of neurobehavioral function of regulation has
been identified in several neurobehavioral MRI and EEG studies
(e.g., the works of Als et al. 2004; Duffy et al. 1994; and Hofer
1994). The studies from our lab (Ferber & Makhoul 2004;
2008) show the interplay between the motor and the state/
sleep/awake subsystems in full-term and in preterm infants
(i.e., that the motor system activation is the source of inhibition
of the attention system and vise versa).
As with a distributed control system, each subsystem output is
used for regulating other subsystems. Thus the subsystems can
be viewed as controllers or regulators that control one another.
Each regulator can be viewed as comprising numerous logic
gates.
A regulator within a distributed control system maintains an
output in an optimal range. According to my view, the balanced
control between the subsystems exists to avoid situations of
extreme arousal or decline, as noted, for example, in situations
of omnipotence versus helplessness or depression versus hypoma-
nia. A hyperalert condition of a subsystem that overrides the
control of the other subsystems may lead to the decline of this sub-
system, as observed, for example, in bipolar affective disorders.
Boolean algebra building blocks known as logic gates may be
used to construct a model for explaining neural connectivity as
well as neurobehavioral subsystems. A change in a state of a sub-
system can be described as the product of an excitatory input and
a NOT (inhibitory) input applied to an AND (excitatory) gate. If
the excitatory input is active and the inhibitory input is not active,
then the gate (subsystem) output will be active. Alternatively, if
the inhibitory input is active, then the gate (subsystem) output
will be not active regardless of the state of the excitatory input.
However, we suggest that AND gates and NOT gates describe
a function of deregulation in neurobehavioral subsystems. The
same is true for an OR gate, in which the output is active if
one or more of its inputs is active.
In contrast, an XOR gate which comprises 2 inputs, A and B,
will have an active output if either A or B but not both are
active. This could be an example for a regulated function of the
neurobehavioral subsystems. See the truth table (Table 1) below:
The brain can be thought of as comprising a huge number of
different types of the above mentioned basic logic gate types.
Since there is a synaptic delay (the equivalent of propagation
time delay in logic gates) in the operation between input acti-
vation and output change of state for every logic gate in a
process, a relatively long execution time for every brain function
might be expected. However, as in Boolean algebra, the rules for
minimization of logic gates required to implement a logic func-
tion apply. By minimizing the number and complexity of the
logic structure as above, the propagation delay time is decreased.
The brain may be able to simplify complex logic functions and
structures as above. This suggests the relatively minimal synaptic
delay time for the complex cortical and subcortical interrelations
(e.g., the impact of the limbic system and hypothalamus on the
frontal control).
To explain discontinuity and nonlinear trends in development,
Neuroconstructivism suggests a transition of observed behavior
from one equilibrium state to another (see figure in Mareschal
et al. 2007b, p.101, and the equation on p. 102).
Such developmental transitions are emphasized using a beha-
vioral variable X as a function of parameter W. X grows up to a
peak and then goes through a transition stage, characterized by
instability and discontinuity, to another stable state which in
turn grows to another peak and so on. This approach explains
the macro picture of development through stages, each of
which is a stable state, up to a transition point. It could also
explain the interplay between the individual neural cell and its
neural environment. Whenever an individual neuron is able to
fire and is not regulated by other neurons, we have an unstable
transition from one stable state to another. To answer one of
the book’s questions, I propose that the functional instability
and nonregulated states may bring about structural changes
which in turn are shown in developmental changes.
The brain works between peaks of arousal and decrement. Its
efficient work is manifested in environmental conditions that
support its interplay between peaks of neurobehavioral subsys-
tems, up to a level of pleasure and harmony.
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Abstract: The authors of this commentary concur with the viewpoint
presented by Mareschal et al. (2007a; 2007b) concerning the relevance
of neurological data when theorizing about cognitive development.
However, we argue here that Mareschal et al. fail to consider
adequately the relevance of reorganizational brain events occurring
through adolescence and early adulthood, especially regarding the
prefrontal cortex and the ontogeny of executive functioning. In
addition, evidence from the lifespan neurodevelopmental literature
indicates that increased activity of neural networks may signify less
efficient processing. This observation is of potential relevance when
considering the neurological changes associated with cognitive
development during childhood and adolescence.
Table 1 (Ferber). Truth Table for XOR gate
Input ‘A’ Input ‘B’ Output
Not Active (0) Not Active (0) regulated (0)
Active (1) Not Active (0) Active (1)
Not Active (0) Active (1) Active (1)
Active (1) Active (1) regulated (0)
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Mareschal et al. present two well written volumes articulating
their version of neuroconstructivism. Specifically, these authors
seek to probe the mechanisms and processes whereby the incho-
ate infant develops cognitively and behaviourally into a sentient,
cognizant adult. The authors advocate an integrative, multidisci-
plinary framework, incorporating data from a range of method-
ologies, including cognitive studies, computational modelling
and neuroimaging.
The authors directly take issue with the Marrian view that levels
of analysis can be considered independently at the computational,
algorithmic, and implementation levels. Instead, they place much
greater weight on the mutual constraints operating between levels
of description. Specifically, the authors argue that theorizing about
cognitive development should be explicitly informed by consider-
ations of processes occurring at the neural implementation
level – a view with which we firmly concur. However, Mareschal
et al. apparently neglect to acknowledge the degree of neural
rewiring that occurs at later stages of individual development.
Specifically, there is accumulating evidence of significant reorgan-
ization of the neural substrate occurring during adolescence and
even into early adulthood (Casey et al. 2000; Huttenlocher & Dab-
holkar 1997; Paus 2005; Spear 2000). These reorganizational pro-
cesses take place during a phase of development when
fundamental modular neurodevelopmental capacities such as
those presented by Mareschal et al. (e.g., visual perception, habitu-
ation, phonological development, reading) have already been
acquired (Luna et al. 2004). Potentially linked to these neural
changes (and notwithstanding issues pertaining to adoption of
the maturational versus interactive specialization position; see
Foster 1997 for a related discussion), there is evidence of develop-
ment during the teenage years with respect to elements of higher
cognitive functioning, particularly regarding the ontogeny of
executive functions (Luna & Sweeney 2004). Again, this is a
domain of the extant literature that is apparently neglected by
Mareschal et al. across the two volumes. It is of considerable inter-
est to reflect on how the authors’ conceptual framework would
address these and related issues, which we are currently investi-
gating empirically in Western Australia (via the Western Australian
Pregnancy Cohort Study, evaluating a group of individuals who
have been followed developmentally since before birth through
to their current age of 16–18 years). Of potential relevance is
the consideration that executive functions are not usually regarded
as modular in either the weak or strong (i.e., Fodorian) theoretical
sense.
In addition to the main conceptual issues discussed above,
some more specific assertions made by the authors are also
questionable with respect to the nexus between prefrontal
cortex and executive functions. Of specific interest is the
authors’ contention (vol. 1, p. 65) that it is difficult to account
for “decreases in the extent of cortical activation in terms of
the progressive maturation of prefrontal cortical areas.” This
position is not justified by the authors with respect to indepen-
dently acquired evidence or data, and it represents an interest-
ing contrast regarding other areas of the lifespan developmental
literature. For example, in the aging literature it has been
argued that overactive cortical networks (as evidenced, for
example, by functional neuroimaging investigations) are indica-
tive of less efficient functional capacity, and that such overactiv-
ity may portend decline and dissolution of those networks and
the cognitive functions they subserve (Dickerson et al. 2005;
Hamalainen et al. 2007). It has been further suggested that,
in older individuals, differences in regional brain integrity
may be linked to functional reorganization through changes in
processing strategy (Greenwood 2007). It seems plausible that
a converse process may take place during acquisition of cogni-
tive skills, as neural networks become more finely tuned and
selective with respect to those external and internal environ-
mental events that are necessary and sufficient for specific net-
works to be activated. In summarizing this section of text (vol.
1, p. 67) the authors contend that “frontal cortical regions,
traditionally believed to be slow to mature, may be active
from early in life.” However, Mareschal et al. apparently omit
to consider the degree to which such activation patterns may
be modified across childhood and into early adulthood, specifi-
cally with respect to higher cognitive functions – as previously
noted. Considering the multiple cytoarchitectonic regions com-
prising the frontal cortex (a disproportionately large and highly
functionally elaborated brain region in humans relative to other
mammalian and primate species), we think it is overly simplistic
to adopt a uniform, homogeneous position with respect to the
maturation of capacities subserved by this region (see Rabbitt
1997 for a review). Moreover, the authors themselves acknowl-
edge (vol. 1, p. 213) that “cognitive development throughout
late childhood and the teenage years is a story of increasing
abstraction,” and that with respect to the neural substrate
underlying this process of increasing abstraction “one candidate
may be the prefrontal cortex” (vol. 1, p. 214).
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Abstract: This book is an excellent manifesto for future work in child
development. It presents a multidisciplinary approach that clearly
demonstrates the value of integrating modeling, neuroscience, and
behavior to explore the mechanisms underlying development and to
show how internal context-dependent representations arise and are
modified during development. Its only major flaw is to have given short
shrift to the study of the role of genetics on development.
Books like Neuroconstructivism (Mareschal et al. 2007a; 2007b)
come along far too infrequently. This two-volume set is nothing
short of a manifesto for how the study of child development in
the twenty-first century should proceed.
The three most important chapters of Volume 1 are Chapters 1
(Introduction), 5 (Principles, mechanisms and processes) and 13
(Conclusions and challenges for the future). Taken together,
these chapters alone can be viewed as a manifesto for how
research in child development should proceed in the future.
This book covers a wide range of interdisciplinary topics, with a
particular emphasis on modeling, especially modeling of the
connectionist kind.
The connectionist revolution came to psychology in the mid
1980s. The ideal starting point for connectionist models at that
time was generally considered to be an undifferentiated (artifi-
cial) neural network substrate with few, if any, constraints that
corresponded even remotely to what might be going on in an
actual brain. But we must not forget that connectionism 20
years ago was still dueling with symbolic AI and that many of
the early models, while necessary as proofs of the power of con-
nectionism, were uninteresting from the standpoint of actually
contributing to an understanding of the mechanisms underlying
cognition. Now that those early battles are a thing of the past,
connectionist models have gradually adopted a far more sensible
middle ground in which modularity, and even rules, are acceptable,
as long as they can be linked in some reasonably broad fashion to
neural substrate. This book incorporates constraints from real brain
functions into the connectionist models it describes, successfully
integrating, insofar as possible, low-level neural constraints,
brain-level constraints, and behavioral constraints.
To begin with, Mareschal et al.’s manifesto puts internal rep-
resentations back at center stage in an attempt to understand
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not only how they drive cognition throughout the course of devel-
opment, but how they emerge and are modified by both the
“external” environment (i.e., embodiment) and the “internal”
environment consisting of other regions of the brain (what they
call “embrainment”).
Representations have been somewhat out of fashion since the
antirepresentational stances of Brooks (1990), Port & van Gelder
(1995) and, especially important in the context of development,
Smith & Thelen (1993) became popular. The authors of Neuro-
constructivism seamlessly fold these more radical perspectives
into their own via the notion partial representations and proactiv-
ity. To me, the authors’ partial representations look for all the
world like a retread of Hebb’s notion of a cell assembly (Hebb
1949). (In perhaps the most surprising oversight of the entire
book, the authors do not even cite Hebb’s work, which is so inti-
mately connected with their own in many ways.) They go on to
summarize neuroconstructivist development (Ch. 5) as being
“about how context-dependence is progressively expressed
through partial representations” (p. 93). For someone who has
spent more than 20 years preaching the gospel of flexible,
context-dependent representations (specifically, in the area of
analogy-making) that are gradually built-up by means of a con-
tinual interaction between high- and low-level constraints,
these words were music to my ears. The authors propose three
underlying domain-general and level-independent mechanisms
that implement context-dependent representation-building –
namely, cooperation, competition, and chronotopy (the “idea
that there is a temporal order in the emergence of functional
units”) (p. 12). These cores ideas of neuroconstructivism are
right on target.
The authors correctly reject Marr’s (1982) tripartite division of
cognitive levels of description. The independence of these levels
was one of the cornerstone principles of traditional AI. The
authors’ unambiguous rejection of these ideas in favor of a
view in which interaction between levels and with the environ-
ment is paramount for the emergence of the partial represen-
tations. They appeal, however, to parsimony as one of their
reasons for rejecting Marr’s views. This is a mystery to me. Par-
simony may be fine as a guiding heuristic for physics, but it’s a
lousy one for cognition, simply because cognition came to us
via the twists and turns and inability ever to back up that charac-
terize evolution. And this is anything but parsimonious.
This then leads to perhaps the most serious criticism of this
book: namely, that is has given short shrift to the role of evolution
in general, and genetics in particular, in development. As a mani-
festo of how child development should be approached, I find
it strange to see but a single page (pp. 218–19) devoted to gen-
etics and development, and to find that the page concludes
with, “. . . in humans, genes provide only very broad sorts of con-
straints on the representations that emerge in cortex” (p. 219).
This statement borders on incomprehensible to me. That the
interaction of genetics, environment, and behavior has profound
and lasting effects on behavior and development is no longer
open to serious debate. To cite a few examples, CREB genes cer-
tainly play a role in memory and recall, even if the exact mechan-
isms are not; BDNF genes affect visual development; FOX2P
almost certainly has some role in enabling language, even if,
once again, the details are still unclear. And the list grows
longer by the day. And memory and recall, vision and language
are without question crucial to the development of represen-
tations in the cortex. In other words, the message for future
developmentalists should be: While you (almost certainly) don’t
have to go to the level of physics or quantum mechanics to
explain cognitive development, you (equally certainly) can no
longer be content to stop at the level of neurons. So, just as the
authors rightly reject Marr’s computationalism in which the
implementational substrate was not supposed to matter to cogni-
tion, it seems equally valid to criticize their not including this
important area in their vision of the way forward in developmen-
tal research. The closest the book comes to taking up some of
these issues is in the chapter on atypical development. But a
much fuller development of this is absolutely necessary.
There are other, more minor points that should be corrected in
later editions of this work. The authors write, “. . . one of the most
important conclusions from the formal study of learning is that
there is no such thing as an unbiased or unconstrained learner
. . . , so cognitive development therefore reflects the outcome of
constrained adaptation” (p. 20). These words could have come
straight from Terry Regier’s (1996) book on constrained connec-
tionism, entitled The human semantic potential; and yet, this
work is not even cited.
In conclusion, this is a first-rate book, a major contribution to
the literature on development. I hope it will serve as a broad
research manifesto on how interdisciplinary research in child
development should be done in the upcoming years.
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Abstract: Neurocostructivism aims to illustrate and explain cognitive
development in relation to the underlying neural structures, with the
help of computational models. This enterprise should be grounded
both in the evolutionary and in the developmental perspectives. In
both, selection plays a fundamental role in the construction of neural
and cognitive structures.
Neuroconstructivism (Mareschal et al. 2007a) is an ambitious,
brave, pioneering attempt to integrate system neuroscience and
cognition across their current boundaries, within a developmen-
tal perspective. Computational modeling might be the best tool
for such a complex task. This project is what we need if neuro-
science has to have any future at all. I shall certainly go back to
this book in the coming years, to refine my understanding of
some of the rich, theoretical framework it explores.
I had some difficulties in grasping whether constructivism
applies to the way cognition emerges from the brain (as in the
subtitle), to how the brain and cognition codevelop, or to
both. From a developmental point of view, I shall argue about
the second interpretation. Let us go to facts. Accumulated evi-
dence overwhelmingly demonstrates the generalized occur-
rence of exuberance and regression in brain development.
Adult neural (and, I will argue, cognitive structures) emerge
by selection from a richer (but constrained) juvenile stock.
This applies not only to neuronal overproduction and death
(as mentioned in ch. 2) but also to the generation of long
axons, axonal branches, synapses, dendritic branches, number
of spines, neurotransmitter receptors and/or expression, and
so on. (reviewed in Innocenti & Price, 2005). In cognitive devel-
opment the establishment of phonemic boundaries early in the
postnatal period (Kuhl & Melzoff 1996), and the evidence of a
progressively more restricted activation of neural structures
during the acquisition of skills, documented by imaging and
electrophysiological data are clear examples of selectionism, as
well as, I believe, Johnson’s concept of “interactive specializ-
ation” (Mareschal 2007a).
The authors make only weak attempts (p. 7) to resolve the
apparent opposition between selectionism and constructivism.
I feel this dyad lies at the core of understanding how genes
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and environment (via neural activity) interact in evolution and
in development. The opposition between selectionism and con-
structivism can be overcome by precise reference to the time-
frames considered. In evolution, the power of selection is
unchallenged and two-sided. One side is the selection of the
genetic networks responsible for the harmonious emergence
of brains/bodies and cognitions/behaviors most appropriate
to the ecological constrains of a given environment (“context”
in the book). The second is the selection of permissive develop-
mental algorythms, in particular development by exuberance
and regression of neurons, axons and so forth, mentioned
above, which allows crossed adjustments of brain structures
(e.g., Kingsbury et al. 2002), bodies, cognitions, and behaviors,
and which actually allows evolution itself (Innocenti 2006). Now
consider the developmental time-frame. Evolutionarily selected
neural and/or cognitive structures are validated by experience
in a context-dependent manner. Competition, cooperation,
and chronotopy, which the authors identified as general devel-
opmental mechanisms, become relevant. Active exploration
(experimenting or proactivity) is the expression of the evolution-
ary heritage, which, at the cognitive level might well consist of
“partial representations” to be tested for their relevance in the
real world. Only part of the structures selected in evolution sur-
vives this second wave of selection. Most important, they will
not be tested and selected simultaneously, thus providing the
framework for construction by sequential selections, a scenario
we proposed for the development of axonal arbors (Zufferey
et al. 1999).
I loved the concept of partial representations proposed by
authors, although representations seem difficult to define rigor-
ously (pp. 4 and 5) and to test experimentally (pp. 221–22).
Several questions spring to mind, for example.: How complex is
a representation? Is it reducible to elemental parts? How far?
In any case, partial representations seem to be economical in
terms of neural resources and are open to completion by devel-
opmental experience and/or learning, in adult life.
In conclusion, I feel that one should accept the overwhelming
evidence that environment and activity, in development are
sculpting-out brain, body, cognition and behavior by selection,
within the boundaries established, for each species, by evol-
ution. Some further elaboration of the evolutionary heritage
may occur based on cycles of generation, testing and vali-
dation/rejection of elemental structures were they axonal
branches, synapses or representations. I would prefer to call
the whole process selectionistic neurocostrutivism. The opposi-
tion then is not so much between selectionism and constructi-
vism as between permissive and instructive morphogenetic
factors, including experience. I have struggled with some of
the concepts before, although not to my full satisfaction
(Zufferey et al. 1999).
One crucial question is, what happens when “context,” in
development, fails to validate the neural and/or cognitive
structures that evolution has selected. This is equivalent to
asking whether the information provided by environment is
permissive or instructive. Many examples of abnormal develop-
ment are specified in the book all of which illustrate genetic
abnormalities (Table 11.1, p. 164). Examples of abnormal
experience in early development due purely to environmental
factors, such as sensory or social deprivation (reviewed in Inno-
centi 2007), toxic insults (e.g., fetal alcohol syndrome), thyroid
disturbances (Berbel et al. 2007), and others, may be more
informative. Some of them illustrate the response of the devel-
oping organism to the abnormal, and therefore potentially
instructive, environmental conditions. The evidence for an
instructive role of development is slim. Often the outcomes
are nothing more than arrested development with no adaptive
consequences whatsoever, providing strong evidence that
development is rather tightly constrained. Thus, if the environ-
mental conditions which drive selection in evolution are not
met, the evolutionary heritage is deleted. This recalls Wiesel’s
statement that: “Innate mechanisms endow the visual system
with highly specific connections but visual experience early in
life is necessary for their maintenance and full development”
(Wiesel 1982).
This book is a very stimulating achievement. Its organization in
Part 1, Foundations, explicating the main principles and the
reasons for attempting the great synthesis of system neuroscience
with cognition and development; the Case Studies section
demonstrating how the principles can be applied; and the final
section, Conclusions, specifying at least some of the open
issues and the future directions is excellent. The “Boxes”
provide essential information for readers not familiar with the
territories explored and are particularly useful for a broad read-
ership. The book provides a solid attempt to establishing a new
field of intellectual and experimental investigations which will
hopefully grow in the coming years.
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Abstract: Neuroconstructivism is a hybrid of two incompatible
philosophical traditions: a radical idealism insisting upon the free
activity of the Subject; and a radical materialistic anthropomorphism,
which ascribes inherent properties of humans (e.g., the ability to
construct) to nonhuman objects or body parts (e.g., the brain). The two
traditions can be combined only by obscuring or confusing the basic
notions.
Long ago, idealist philosophy taught about the Subject, which
actively constructs the world of objects, as a product of its own
externalizing action. Can this activist view be integrated into
the context of modern neuroscience?
Neuroconstructivism (Mareschal et al. 2007a) is an example
demonstrating that the we cannot simply take the features pre-
viously belonging to the mind and reattribute them to the
brain, leaving the rest unchanged. The authors’ brave attempt
to integrate different approaches is laudable. However, the
intended synthesis came at the price of making the fundamental
concepts so vague and fuzzy that they can be filled by any delib-
erate content. Let us follow the tragic fate of three of these
concepts.
Representation is the central concept. “Cognitive development
is about how representations emerge” (p. 89). But what is rep-
resentation? If there is anything common in the plethora of defi-
nitions of this polysemous word, it is that a representation
presumes three things: one that is represented; one that rep-
resents; and one to which (dative case) it is represented. For
Catholics, for example, the Pope represents Jesus during the
temporary absence of the latter; note that if there are no Catho-
lics, the representational function of the Pope would not have any
sense. An ambassador represents his state in a foreign state. My
attorney can represent me in the court.
But to whom, or for whom, do mental representations rep-
resent the world? To the spectators in the theater in my head?
Mostly, representations are described with the adjective
“internal,” obviously meaning that they are contained within
something. (See Ja¨rvilehto 2001 for the usage of inner/outer
relationships.) What might this container be? Sometimes it
appears to be the brain (e.g., pp. 71, 147), sometimes the mind
(p. 16); representations can exist “in the brain, body, and environ-
ment” (p. 100). Finally, a representation is “any component . . . if
it can have an independent effect on behavior” (p. 100), a defi-
nition which is practically identical to the assertion radically
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rejected by the authors, that there is no representation (Thelen &
Smith, 1994). In a symptomatic footnote, the authors confess that
they “. . . remain agnostic as to where exactly mental represen-
tations lie . . . between brain states and world states” (p. 28).
This is in complete agreement with the classical idealistic dichot-
omy between subject and object (here: the brain and the world).
If we say that “stimuli do become represented by individual
neurons” (p. 112), we simply mean that these neurons fire with
a much higher rate to some stimuli than to others. What does
the term represent add to this fact? If a drop of water does not
leave a trace on a mineral, but a drop of an acid does, then,
does the mineral represent the acid?
In their notion of partial representations, the authors take a big
step toward the concept of representations as “functional systems”
(Anokhin 1974), as anticipatory interactions between the organism
and its environment (Bickhard 2005), but they were probably
afraid of their own courage and thus stopped halfway. The term
partial is misleading because it insinuates the possibility of some-
thing like full representation. Is it a representation of an object in
all its details including all features of all its elementary particles,
even those not yet discovered? The authors’ answer is very
simple: “the most accurate and complete representation . . . will
be provided by the raw sensory data” (p. 112). Therefore, to get
the most complete representation of stars, we should not attend
lectures in astronomy but merely record all retinal cell activity
while we are looking at the sky. This idea is a logical consequence
of the authors’ general view of cognition as constraint, as filtering
and processing of information rather than obtaining it. Within this
view, indeed, cognition can only impoverish raw data.
Constructivism. This is the notion that gives its name to the
whole approach. If constructivism is minimally defined as a
credit for proactive features of behavior, then I am a constructi-
vist too. But the proactivity rightly emphasized by the authors is
not construction, because the cognitive organization is actively
extracted from the world, rather than being imposed by the
subject (Newspeak: brain). Likewise, activity is not just the
ability to filter out the irrelevant and facilitate the processing of
relevant information. The organism does not filter information
but picks it up according to its needs and tasks, as “a datum for
a certain hypothesis will not only sensitize and bias an intelli-
gence officer toward the incidental flow of information which is
indicative of the same hypothesis, but will . . . also lead the
officer to seek such information.” (Navon 1981, p. 5).
The two main mechanisms of the constructivism, cooperation
and competition, simply describe positive and negative effects,
respectively, of any element A on an element B. They are not
principles found out in an empirical study of development (as
the presence of right angles is not an empirical feature of
squares), but just consequences of our use of words “element,”
“effect,” and so on.
A legitimate way to describe a hard-to-define approach is to
use definitions of its rejected alternatives. Thus neuroconstructi-
vism rejects “. . . that cognition unfolds according to some predes-
tined blueprint encoded in the genes” (p. 87), that the child is “a
passive organism imprinting on environmental events over which
it has no effect” (p. 96), “the same way that a sponge would soak
up water” (p. 214), that perception is “. . . a purely serial, feedfor-
ward sequence of processing stages” (p. 109). Does somebody
believe in such things? What is the value of a triumph over this
army of straw men?
Embodiment. It is true that “talk of embodiment . . . has
become increasingly frequent in mainstream psychology”
(p. 74). Unfortunately, however, the ideas usually become main-
stream talk when they lose their essence. The authors define
embodiment as a constraint. My cognitive activity takes into
account the fact that I have only two arms. “. . . an agent is
embedded within a body that serves to constrain the agent’s
interactions with the environment” (p. 49); “each brain region
develops within the context of other parts of the brain” “just as
the brain is situated within a body” (p. 59).
This conception of embrainment and embodiment would
readily be embraced even by spiritualists. Of course, in the con-
ditions of a finite human life, the agency of the immortal soul is
constrained by the peculiar constitution of the earthly body.
The authors miss the fact that embodiment is not just placing
“the agent” (fig-leaf for “the subject”) into a human body, and
the latter into a cultural environment, as their Fig, 4.1e (p. 72)
suggests. The very existence, emergence, and development of
“the agent” is impossible without this body and this environment;
they are not constraints but sources and causal factors, condi-
ciones sine quibus non a human. Conceiving of embodiment as
just a constraint is like conceiving of Christianity as regular
attendance of Sunday services.
As Jordan (2000) formulated it, living systems do not possess
knowledge; they are knowledge (see also Maturana & Varela
1980). We need not be prisoners of the wrong opposition:
either passivity or constructivism. Cognition is not constructed
by the brain using blocks of representations as a wall is con-
structed by masons using blocks of concrete. Cognition is a
high-level energetic nonequilibrium within an organism/
environment system, whose one component (the organism)
must perform continuous anticipatory control of its behavior to
maintain its stability. The brain plays a key role in this control,
but it is not a creator of cognition, any more than the “mind” of
old authors. Though it is true that the enormous complexity
of the working brain can fascinate us, as the enormous power
of the sun fascinated earlier people, future generations will
smile at our modern cerebral cult like we now smile at the
solar cult of our forefathers.
Representing development: models, meaning,
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Abstract:Neuroconstructivism (Mareschal et al. 2007a) provides a useful
framework for how to integrate research from different levels of analysis
to model the multidimensional dynamics of development. However, the
authors overlook the topic of meaning, a fundamental feature of
cognition and subjective experience and also downplay the nonlinear
nature of developmental causality. Neuroconstructivism is overly
optimistic on the point of how well current computational models can
address the challenge of complexity in developmental science.
Philosophers of science point out that good models should
suggest experiments, allow predictions about the consequences
of interventions or manipulations, and prompt new questions
or directions for further research (e.g., Keller 2002). In this
light, Neuroconstuctivism is a significant step forward in the
use of modeling within developmental science. Particularly note-
worthy, the authors have provided a conceptual framework that
takes seriously the notion that the minimal unit of analysis
necessary for understanding behavior and cognition is the
“brain in a body in an environment” system (Chiel & Beer
1997; Nelson 2007). Although the argument against the useful-
ness of radical reductionism has been made by a number of
developmentalists in recent years, it is certainly the case that
many neuroscientists and psychologists continue to speak as if
understanding the brain will yield a full understanding of beha-
vioral and cognitive development. Neuroconstructivism provides
a cogent argument against this reductionistic view and outlines a
well articulated example of how to integrate research from cogni-
tive studies, computational modeling, neuroimaging, and devel-
opmental psychology to model some of the complexities and
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multidimensional dynamics of the developmental process. I am
in agreement with the spirit of this integrative effort, particularly
its emphasis on context dependence, multilevel isomorphism,
and developmental trajectory, and its acknowledgment that
explanations of cognitive development must be consistent with
our knowledge of developmental and evolutionary biology (Lick-
liter & Honeycutt 2003). However, I have several reservations
about the scope of the present version of the neuroconstructive
approach. These include (1) that the authors have downplayed
the nonlinear causality often at play in the developmental
process, and (2) have effectively ignored the importance of
value and meaning in the formation and maintenance of cognitive
representations.
It is surprising that a framework designed to address the devel-
opment of cognitive representations, based on the assumption
that “cognition is essentially a process involving the manipulation
of information” (p. 208), effectively sidesteps the topic of
meaning and the issue of subjective experience. Value and
meaning must be addressed in any theory of cognitive develop-
ment; information takes form only when it is personally meaning-
ful. As recently reviewed by Tucker (2007), the formation of
cognitive representations is achieved by the same limbic net-
works that provide the motivational control of behavior. In
other words, the expectancies that guide cognition are personal
and motivated. Neuroconsructivism does not adequately
address the importance of meaning or the related issue of subjec-
tivity, despite its emphasis on the “proactive” nature of develop-
ment. This is an obvious shortcoming of the current framework
and a significant challenge to computational modeling. In this
light, the omission of reference to the work of Walter
Freeman, which provides an important foundation for thinking
about and modeling the links between meaning and represen-
tation, is surprising. As Freeman (2001) has pointed out,
meaning derives from the entire brain and body, with the
history of the organism built into muscles, endocrine glands,
and neural connections. The chapter by Sporns (2007) that
appears in the companion volume does provide an initial step
in addressing the psychobiology of meaning by emphasizing the
importance of value systems in neuromodulation and learning.
The scope and application of the neuroconstructive approach
would benefit from additional efforts focused on how to incorpor-
ate the role of value and meaning into its models of cognitive
development.
With regard to the larger issue of modeling the developmental
process, while development can sometimes be viewed as a chain
of cause/effect relationships (a common assumption in compu-
tational simulations), these chains often turn out to be loops,
where cause becomes consequence and consequence becomes
cause. Indeed, this nonlinear and distributed nature of causality
is a fundamental feature of the developmental process (Gottlieb
1997; Gottlieb & Halpern 2002) and the authors have not gone
far enough in coming to terms with how to address this aspect
of developmental complexity. Although Neuroconstuctivism
does make a strong case for refocusing our attention from
making simple causal attributions (to the genes or to the environ-
ment, for example), it does not provide a clear road map for how
to model the varied systematic processes and interactions that
take place within and between levels (i.e., genes, neurons, hor-
mones, social interaction, culture) of the human developmental
system (Johnston & Edwards 2002). Recent evidence from the
rapidly growing field of epigenetics demonstrating the intricate
regulatory networks of genes, their products, and the features
of the organism’s internal and external environment highlights
the mind-boggling combinatorial complexity of the bidirectional
traffic inherent in the process of development.
In sum, I found the authors overly optimistic as regards how
far connectionist models of development will get us. Early in
the text, the authors state their aim in Neuroconstructivism is
to “explain development.” This is an ambitious goal, to say the
least, given that the process of development is a dizzyingly
complex multidetermined phenomenon and the number of vari-
ables, interactions, and contingencies involved in the journey
from fertilized egg to functional adult may well put its full under-
standing beyond human comprehension. This is not due to a lack
of trying – thousands of scientists have worked on or are working
on various aspects of this challenge. Keller (2002) has recently
argued that there are likely some phenomena in the natural
world that extend beyond our grasp, too complex to fit neatly
into any of our models, theories, or explanations. The process
of development may well turn out to be one of these phenomena.
That said, it is also the case that a better understanding of the
ways and means of development can make a significant contri-
bution to how we understand nature and ultimately, how we
understand ourselves. Despite its shortcomings, Neuroconstucti-
vism is a step forward on this quest. While it does not succeed in
explaining development, it does succeed in providing an integra-
tive model of the development of cognition that will likely suggest
experiments, allow predictions about the consequences of inter-
ventions, and prompt new questions for research. That seems
plenty to expect of this or any other functional model of
development.
It’s high time: Cognitive neuroscience lives
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Abstract: Neuroconstructivism (Mareschal et al. 2007a) heralds a
departure from the standard “associationism” that has dominated the
English speaking cognitive and neuroscience community for
generations. Its central concept is context dependency: encellment,
embrainment, embodiment and ensocioment. This reviewer welcomes
the breath of fresh air in overcoming the “deconstructions” of
postmodernism. The program is carried out with a carefully selected
sample of empirical evidence with an emphasis on development. This
review points to some of the books’ strengths and shortcomings, and
adds a few observations that carry the program further.
The English speaking scientific and philosophical communities
have been dominated by Humean associationism: empirical
observations are stuck together to compose explanations of
observations at a higher order. In brain science this approach
dates from Viennese neurology of the latter part of the nine-
teenth century: sensory inputs become associated in “association
areas of the cortex.”
Neuroconstructivism presents a different panorama. They see
constructivist development as a progressive increase in the com-
plexity of representations that is realized in the brain by a pro-
gressive elaboration of cortical structures. Interestingly, leads
to ‘cleverer’ and not simply more knowledgeable organisms.
The authors describe this process as encellment, embrain-
ment, embodiment, and ensocioment and give good reasons
why each of these processes is necessary to provide a reasonably
good understanding of the whole constructivist endeavor.
Without detracting from the enterprise as a whole, I do have
some queries:
1. The authors’ approach deals with complexity; why do they
not explicitly say more about complexity theory, non-linear
dynamics as it applies to one or another scales of investigation?
(The exception is Chapter 5 written about a model by another
author). They come close: They compare our world of artifacts,
texts, media and cultural practices to the activity created
whorls that form the “umwelt” of the blue fin tuna. Whorls
serve as attractors in nonlinear dynamics. In the language of com-
plexity theory, cultural practices when embrained through embo-
diment, serve as attractors.
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2. Why do the authors limit themselves to neurons and circuits
in their chapter on embrainment and, despite the acknowledge-
ment that populations of cells not single cells are involved in pro-
cessing, ignore processes occurring in the fine fiber structures of
dendrites, and axonal branching where the populations interact?
Again they come close: in their chapter on principles, mechan-
isms and processes they note that the emergent functionality of
the individual neuron depends largely on the chemical and cellu-
lar context of the neuron. In short, the fine fiber, ephaptic, and
synaptic processes (and even glia) are more important for pro-
gressive development and cognitive processing than the brain’s
neuronal circuitry. Though the authors do not recognize this,
connectionist models actually deal mathematically with neuro-
nodes that represent connections among neurons, connections
occurring in the fine fibers of the brain, not neurons per se.
This is because most modelers erroneously describe the nodes
as neurons.
A few specific embellishments: In discussing Piaget and his
contributions, the authors point out that there is a failure in his
contributions to deal with the dynamics that move the child
from one cognitive level to the next. Both Piaget and I wrote
for years about equilibration, a static reaching of equilibrium.
But for both of us this view changed with the advent of Prigo-
gine’s “temporary stabilities far from equilibrium” (Prigogine
1980; Prigogine & Stengers 1984). Piaget, Inhelder, and I dis-
cussed this issue and agreed that stabilization in the sense of tem-
porary stabilities was a required necessary improvement over our
earlier views. Again, it is important to make complexity theory,
stabilities as attractors, explicit in Neuroconstructivism.
In the treatment of vision some weaknesses become evident.
The authors are struggling to release themselves from current
interpretations of the results of experiments. The authors cor-
rectly criticize the way in which the so-called dorsal and ventral
visual pathways have been exploited: that often the pathways
are activated in reverse (as there are just as many connections
in the reverse direction – as I have also emphasized (Pribram
1974). They do not go the distance, however, to suggest that
object constancy can precede the divergence of the two as
suggested by the results of (Zeki 1983; Ungerleider et al. 1977).
Furthermore, the elimination of cortico-cortical and subcorti-
cal thalamic connections that presumably underlie the ventral
pathway does not disturb visual processing, while when the rel-
evant subcortical to cortical pathways are disrupted, visual pro-
cessing by the inferotemporal cortex ceases. All of this
evidence provides additional support for the conclusions
arrived at by the authors in Neuroconstructivism (Pribram 1986).
A last point about vision: In the second volume Chapter 2 is
based on an isomorphic model of processing images in the
primary visual pathway while Chapter 3 deals with processing
in the same pathway in the spectral domain. The two points of
departure are a matter of scale (gross vs. micro) but, as the two
ways of dealing with imaging are very different, the differences
should not be glossed over but addressed somewhere in the
volume.
A final comment: The neuroconstructivist view predicts that
representations will become progressively more fragmentary
because they emerge within (and build on) increasingly
complex representational contexts. In short, the representations
are content, not location addressable. But retrieval codes are
location addressable, thus there is some gross “localization of
function” in brain systems.
In conclusion: Neuroconstructivism is, to my mind, a landmark
contribution. I liked especially the treatment of habituation –
and would add the amygdala and other basal ganglia systems to
the discussion (see Pribram 2006). Also, the treatment of phono-
logical development is seminal –[and I want to emphasize that
the “motor cortex” in general – not only in audition – deals,
not with the programming of movements, but with processing
“targets” or “images of achievement” (see Pribram 1991).
As the reader can see, I am enthusiastic about the presentation
that carries forward a program consonant with one that I envi-
saged (Pribram 1965) to which the authors have already added
much. Just what the journal Behavioral and Brain Science is so
good at stimulating.
Toward automatic constructive learning
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Abstract: Neuroconstructivist modeling can be usefully extended with
algorithms that build their own topology and recruit existing
knowledge, effectively constructing a hierarchy of network modules.
Possible benefits include allowing abilities to emerge naturally, in a way
that affords objective study, deeper insights, and more rapid progress,
and provides more serious consideration of the implications of
constructivism.
The authors (Mareschal et al. 2007a) make a convincing case that
constraints from brain, body and environment should be taken
seriously when trying to explain psychological development and
that computational modeling has an important theoretical role
to play in such explanations. My commentary focuses on some
interesting comments made in Neuroconstructivism’s Box 1.1
(p. 13) concerning constructivist approaches to the modeling of
development. There they raise the possibility that neural net-
works could mimic constructivist development with a hierarchy
of networks such that the outputs of networks solving simple pro-
blems could serve as inputs to networks solving more complex
problems. In this way, later and more complex knowledge
could be based on, and benefit from, earlier and simpler
knowledge.
Currently, most such models are designed and arranged by
hand, where each network is trained separately and then com-
bined in a designed hierarchy. The influential model of object
processing featured in chapter 9 of Volume 1 is a good
example of this approach (Mareschal et al. 1999). That model
neatly explains the well-known de´calage in development of
object permanence between looking and reaching measures
(Baillargeon 1987) by noting that information processed by
ventral and dorsal visual streams needs to be integrated in reach-
ing tasks, but not in looking tasks, which can rely solely on the
dorsal stream.
One limitation of such models is that much of their ability is
supplied by the human modelers who cleverly arrange the
training and connectivity between various network modules.
In this case, one network module learns to recognize objects
based on their static features while another learns to follow
the trajectory of moving objects. A third network module
learns to reach for objects by integrating these two skills, thus
explaining why successful reaching takes longer to achieve
than successful looking.
Recent work in knowledge-based neural learning raises the
possibility that the design and arrangement of such hierarchical
networks could be done automatically by the learning algorithm
itself without human intervention (Shultz & Rivest 2001; Shultz
et al. 2007b). The algorithm used in this work has been
dubbed knowledge-based cascade-correlation (KBCC) because
it extends the earlier cascade-correlation (CC) algorithm to
enable the recruitment of old networks into new learning. CC
is a constructive neural learner (Fahlman & Lebiere 1990) that
has been used to model a wide range of developmental phenom-
ena (Shultz 2003). It works by starting with a simple network with
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only input and output units, and then recruiting single hidden
units as needed to reduce network error. An interesting variant
called sibling-descendant CC (SDCC) allows classic descendant
candidate units to compete with sibling candidate units (Baluja &
Fahlman 1994). As in ordinary CC, the candidate hidden unit
whose activation correlates best with network error is the one
that actually gets recruited. A descendant recruit is installed on
its own layer just beyond any existing hidden units, whereas a
sibling recruit is installed on the current highest layer of
hidden units. Evidence indicates that SDCC produces equivalent
coverage of developmental phenomena to that provided by
classic CC, but with a greater variety of network topologies,
most with less network depth and fewer connection weights
(Shultz et al. 2007a).
KBCC is a natural extension of CC in which previously learned
networks are saved and made available to be recruited in new
learning. These older networks compete with each other and
with single-unit candidates in the usual fashion. Namely, the can-
didate whose activations correlate best with network error is the
new recruit. KBCC was designed (Shultz & Rivest 2001) to
capture the pervasive tendency of humans to build their new
learning on their existing knowledge rather than learning every-
thing from scratch (Heit 1994; Pazzani 1991; Wisniewski 1995).
Such knowledge-based constructivism can account for some of
the ease and speed of human learning and for the interference
effects that sometimes arise.
Prospects for simulating cognitive developmental phenomena
with KBCC are good but only just beginning. A preliminary
KBCC model of the benchmark balance-scale task (Shultz
et al. 2007b) suggests that KBCC could cover a genuine torque
rule, as opposed to a mere addition rule (Quinlan et al. 2007)
in a terminal stage in accord with the likelihood that adolescents
acquire such a torque rule by direct instruction in science classes
(Siegler & Klahr 1982). Symbolic rules, such as the torque rule,
which predicts that the side of the scale with higher torque
(product of weight and distance from the fulcrum) will be the
side that descends, can be inserted into the recruitment pool of
KBCC in a neural form.
Although most KBCC simulations report faster and more
accurate learning by virtue of recruiting existing knowledge
(Shultz et al. 2007b), one simulation demonstrates that prior
knowledge can be not just helpful, but even essential, in learning.
That project shows that prior knowledge of divisibility is required
for networks to learn how to detect prime numbers from
examples of prime and composite integers (Egri & Shultz 2006).
The import of knowledge-based learning for modeling neuro-
constructivism is that automatic organization of hierarchical,
modular networks may now be within our grasp. Just as classic
CC networks are able to construct their own topology automati-
cally as they learn, KBCC can organize multiple networks into a
hierarchy that allows the output of some older, knowledgeable
networks to feed inputs of other units and networks and the
outputs involved in new learning.
Letting computational models do their own thing seems pre-
ferable because it makes the modeling enterprise less artistic
and more scientific. It allows the intelligence of computational
systems to be taken out of the hands of skillful modelers and
placed inside the algorithms themselves. In turn, this allows intel-
ligent behavior to emerge in a more natural fashion, as opposed
to being engineered by human handlers, thus affording a deeper
glimpse into the way phenomena might really work. Models
allowing such emergence may well be ultimately wrong, as vir-
tually all models and theories are, but at least their workings
can be more fully examined and tested in an objective, scientific
manner, thus advancing the field more directly and more rapidly.
In short, emergent models take constructivism more seriously.
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Abstract: In this response, we consider four main issues arising
from the commentaries to the target article. These include further
details of the theory of interactive specialization, the relationship
between neuroconstructivism and selectionism, the implications
of neuroconstructivism for the notion of representation, and the
role of genetics in theories of development. We conclude by
stressing the importance of multidisciplinary approaches in the
future study of cognitive development and by identifying
the directions in which neuroconstructivism can expand in the
Twenty-first Century.
R1. Introduction
We are grateful to the commentators for highlighting
many of the key ideas that lie at the heart of the neurocon-
structivist framework. Among those key ideas are the
following (see, e.g., Bateson, Bremner & Spence,
French, Innocenti, Lickliter, Pribram):
1. Neuroconstructivism seeks to integrate research
from different levels of analysis to model the multidimen-
sional dynamics of development, including findings from
cognitive studies, computational modeling, neuroimaging,
and developmental and evolutionary biology;
2. Neuroconstructivism lays particular emphasis on the
concepts of emergent specialization, context dependence,
multilevel isomorphism (consistency between levels of
description without reductionism) and developmental
trajectories; and
3. Neuroconstructivism appeals to three domain-general
and level-independent mechanisms to implement the build-
ing of context-dependent representations: cooperation,
competition, and chronotopy (the idea that there is a tem-
poral order in the emergence of functional units).
In articulating the neuroconstructivist framework, our
aim in the two volumes was (as Bateson nicely puts it)
to offer a road map to render usable long-held intuitions
about the interplay between the developing organism
and its environment. We believed the time was ripe for
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this endeavor because of the emergence of new methods
for study the process of development in genetics,
biology, brain imaging, and computer science.
We group our response to the commentaries under
several headings. We begin by considering the theory of
interactive specialization in greater detail. We then con-
sider the potential tension that exists between neuro-
constructivism and selectionism. In the next section, we
address a cluster of issues involving the idea of represen-
tation: the relation between partial and full represen-
tations; how representations may become more
specialized to domains across development, yet the
system as a whole can demonstrate increases in abstrac-
tion, flexibility, and in some cases, context independence.
Following that, we address the role of genetics in develop-
ment, reconciling our belief in the importance of genetics
with its relatively low profile in the two volumes. This leads
us to consider two directions to extend the neuroconstruc-
tivist framework: to incorporate lifespan and evolutionary
perspectives. We then address a set of individual issues
covering chronotopy, developmental disorders, subjectiv-
ity and value, and the use of formal methods. We finish
by acknowledging and rectifying some omissions, and
consider the challenges facing neuroconstructivism in
the future.
R2. Advances in interactive specialization
Innocenti and Anderson both make specific comments
about processes related to the Interactive Specialization
model (Johnson 2000; 2001) presented within our discus-
sion of embrainment. Anderson presents a method for
establishing the degree of unique specialization of cortical
regions, defined as a cortical region that is involved in
performing some computations but not others. In particu-
lar, he argues for a distinction between computational
specialization and domain specialization. In compu-
tational specialization, regions develop increasingly well-
defined subfunctional roles within an activated
network; with respect to cognitive domains, specializ-
ation would be a property of the particular network
of regions. In domain specialization, it is the regions
themselves that become increasingly dedicated to a
narrow range of cognitive functions, thereby restricting
their involvement in other domains. Anderson then pre-
sents initial findings from a meta-analysis of functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies and
argues that they provide support for the computational
specialization view: The unit of domain specialization
appears to be the network of regions rather than
regions per se.
While we have not defined the end-state of Interactive
Specialization in the level of detail described by
Anderson, we agree with his conclusions that the results
of specialization may be cortical regions that play multiple
roles in different domains. Each region has an increasingly
specialized role as part of the network activated to support
the computations necessary for a given domain. Indeed,
this notion resonates well with the general idea of partial
representations. However, developmental work argues
that active brain areas move from broad and fuzzy, to
less broad and more specialized (e.g., Durston et al.
2006). Such a shift would seem to indicate that regions
lose at least some of their contribution to specific cognitive
functions across development.
Anderson’s approach is simple but powerful and offers
provocative results. Of course, there are limitations to
what a meta-analysis can achieve, imposed in the main
by the quality and consistency of the contributing
studies. The practical limitations of fMRI studies include
the predominant reliance on subtraction methodologies,
the poor temporal acuity, the mix of whole-brain analyses
and region of interest analyses, and the variability of tech-
niques employed within the analyses themselves (smooth-
ing functions, thresholds, etc.). Some of the apparent
involvement of multiple cortical areas in multiple tasks
may be a consequence of the limitations of (some of) the
studies included in the meta-analysis.
In our own work, we have embraced the distinction that
Anderson has identified, and designed fMRI paradigms
to test it empirically. The most important requirement,
here, is that the cortical areas activated by different
tasks should be evaluated within the same participant;
otherwise between-participant variability may be mista-
ken for distributed processing. That is, if a region per-
forms function x in one participant but function y in
another participant, one might (mistakenly) infer that
this region performs both function x and function y in
the normal human brain. In the lab of one of our
authors (M.S.C.T.), one current study employs multiple
tasks within the broader domain of language (auditory
comprehension, reading, naming, semantic retrieval, and
gesture production) carried out by the same participants.
The analyses target four regions of interest to examine
their relative involvement in the functional networks acti-
vated during each task. The design is event-related to
allow for analyses of functional connectivity between the
regions; and the study uses a lifespan design with a
cross-sectional sample from children of 7 years old up to
adults of 75, to explore whether regional or network
specialization alters with development and/or aging.
The practical limitations of a paradigm such as this for
addressing interactive specialization are that many of the
interesting developmental processes will have been
(largely) completed by the youngest ages in which it is
practical to run the paradigm; and even with an event-
related design, the temporal acuity can offer only a very
blurred view of the computational relations between the
regions involved. fMRI designs must therefore be com-
plemented by methods that are more readily applicable
to infancy and that offer better temporal acuity, such as
electrophysiology (see, e.g., De Haan 2007; Nelson &
Monk 2001).
Additionally, we suspect there is further progress to be
made in exploring interactive specialization through com-
putational modeling. Within this discipline, one must pre-
cisely specify what it would mean for emergent
specialization to be (in the main) a property of networks
of regions, with each region participating in many such net-
works. What exactly is the computational role of a region in
these networks? Does the region offer, for example,
modality-specific partial representations (e.g., dimensions
of visual information)? Or a particular computational primi-
tive (e.g., inhibitory control, analysis of sequences)? Or is it
a chameleon, adopting different computational guises
in each functional network? For ease of explanation, we
would probably prefer the first or second options to be
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true. However, even simple connectionist networks can
learn to demonstrate the third property.1 Such “context sen-
sitive” computations are intrinsic to connectionist networks,
which is why we believe they are an excellent tool to inves-
tigate cognition within a neuroconstructivist framework.
The key issue would then become to understand how
such chameleonlike computational properties are exploited
by, and change over, development.
R3. Neuroconstructivism versus selectionism
Innocenti argues that selectionism, the process of
pruning neural connections to cull those that are irrele-
vant, noisy, or redundant, may provide a basis for Interac-
tive Specialization. We agree wholeheartedly, with the
caveat that constructive neural processes may also play
an important role. It is worth making clear the perceived
tension between constructivism and selectionism, before
indicating why we think the two are in fact largely consist-
ent with each other. Constructivist development argues
for a progressive increase in the complexity of represen-
tations, which enables new competences to develop
based on earlier, simpler ones. Within neuroconstructi-
vism, this increase in representational complexity is
realized in the brain by a progressive elaboration of func-
tional cortical structures. By contrast, Innocenti points to
the large accumulation of empirical evidence for the gen-
eralized occurrence of exuberance and regression in brain
development. Under the selectionist view “adult neural
(and . . . cognitive structures) emerge by selection from a
richer (but constrained) juvenile stock” as Innocenti puts
it. On the one hand we have elaboration while on the
other we have regression.
We believe these positions are consistent if one views
the exuberance and regression in terms of (potential) com-
putational resources, and the elaboration of structures in
terms of actual functions. For us, selection is an
outcome of the fundamental processes of cooperation
and competition that lead to the emergence of partial
representations. Innocenti seems agnostic as far as how
goal-directed the exuberance preceding the regression is,
but a fair amount is now known about the experience-
dependent, goal-directed elaboration of neural structures
(see, e.g., Quartz & Sejnowski 1997). From a constructivist
viewpoint, there is also a sense in which the emergence of
partial representations in different regions sets the stage
for the emergence of specialized networks of regions, to
deliver more complex cognitive functions (as discussed
above).
Shultz outlines a novel type of constructivist neural
network that captures this idea. In knowledge-based
cascade correlation (KBCC), the overall system tests and
recruits networks from existing stock when they are
required to support new computations. We speculate
that a KBCC network architecture may capture, at least
to some extent, emerging functionality in the prefrontal
cortex (PFC). Converging lines of evidence show that
the PFC has an important role in orchestrating other cor-
tical regions during functional brain development
(Johnson 2005; Thatcher 1992), as Foster, van
Eekelen, & Mattes (Foster et al.) point out. We believe
that constructivist neural networks of the kind described
by Shultz are worth exploring as models of PFC functional
development, in addition to the selective pruning process
preferred by Innocenti. This leads us to a wider consider-
ation of the nature of representations within the neurocon-
structivist framework.
R4. Representation: Multiple modalities, flexibility,
and abstraction
Our emphasis on the emergence of partial representations
to drive behavior elicited several kinds of responses.
Bremner & Spence argue for the importance of multi-
sensory/multimodal experiences to deliver enriched rep-
resentations that serve more than the child’s immediate
behavioral goals. French applauds the combination of
dynamic systems theory and connectionist approaches
inherent in the notion of partial representations. His
research in analogy-making has led him to endorse the
same idea (or “gospel”) of flexible, context-dependent rep-
resentations that are gradually constructed via a continual
interaction between high- and low-level constraints.
Kotchoubey argues that the very concept of represen-
tation implies a Cartesian theatre and the need for a
homunculus to whom the content of representations is
made available. Moreover, he wonders how “full” instead
of partial representations might ever come about. For
Campos & Sotillo, the emergence of specialized,
context-dependent representations must be complemen-
ted by the later emergence of explicit representations
that “permit independence from context, conscious
reasoning, and interrepresentational relations,” in line
with the theory of representational redescription proposed
by Karmiloff-Smith (1992). Indeed, the notion that
context-dependent partial representations are the
outcome of interactive specialization prompts further
questions. For example, how does this square with the
idea of the increasing abstraction of the child’s represen-
tation over development? How does it fit with the
idea of increasing flexibility in the child’s use of knowl-
edge, for example in the case of the development of
meta-cognition? If anything, is this not an increase in
context independence?
First, we agree with Bremner & Spence regarding the
importance of multisensory and multimodal represen-
tations. We acknowledge that we may not have empha-
sized this sufficiently: Multimodal integration is a major
constraint on development that played an important role
in Piaget’s theories and has been vindicated by neuros-
cientific research. We expect that in many cases, partial
representations will be the consequence of detecting con-
tingencies between multiple sets of sensory and motor
information in regions where this information converges,
and that richer information will aid in the detection of
those contingencies. When a region receives multiple
inputs, this is termed a fan-in. We also expect fan-out to
be important – that is, where a region drives several
outputs (see, e.g., the model of infant-object interactions
described in chapt. 9 of Vol. I). Indeed, to the extent
that the brain exhibits bidirectional connectivity, multiple
outputs may be as influential as multiple inputs in
driving the development of the representations in a
given region.
Returning to our framework, we see multisensory inte-
gration as falling under the principle of embrainment,
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where the development and processing in one region is
influenced by different brain regions (in this case,
sensory cortices). This is similar to the sensorimotor
model of the acquisition of speech sounds described in
chapter 8 of Volume I. The same model has indeed
been used to account for effects of multisensory inte-
gration (Westermann 2001). In this model two neural
maps were linked via developing Hebbian connections.
By exposing the model to multidimensional data sets
with different correlational structures, Westermann
demonstrated how perceptual change in each domain
(such as categorical perception and perceptual prototypes)
as well as multidimensional integration (the McGurk
effect) can emerge from the gradual integration of unimo-
dal data into a unified multimodal percept.
There is, however, a sense in which the idea of multisen-
sory integration depends on the level of description. In
general, we would expect the same neurocomputational
mechanisms to operate between domains as within a
single domain. Forming a (partial) representation requires
learning about the statistics of patterns of presynaptic
activity. The neuron doing the learning cannot know if
the inputs it is receiving come from one or multiple
domains. So the mechanism used must be the same in
both cases. Multisensory integration is therefore a prop-
erty that is salient at a particular (architectural) level of
description.
Are the representations that result from the convergence
of multiple senses any more abstract than those that result
from a single sense? Possibly, in the sense that they are
not bound to a single modality alone. A further sense in
which increases in abstraction may be the consequence
of development is the detection of higher-order invar-
iances found in progressively higher layers of self-organiz-
ing neural networks, for example as observed in the
mammalian visual system (see review in Ch. 6 of Vol. I).
A more challenging prospect is to explain increases in flexi-
bility in terms of context-dependent partial represen-
tations. We suspect the explanation will be in terms of
the development of executive functioning, where flexibility
is the ability to take advantage of existing knowledge in
driving new behaviors. We are in agreement with Foster
et al. on this point, as discussed in the previous section.
Does the idea of flexibility necessarily imply context inde-
pendence? We believe it does not. Equally, it may consti-
tute the ability to switch back and forth between different
contexts in a system whose representations remain
context-bound.
Turning to the concerns of Kotchoubey, we do not
agree that the concept of a representation or of an infor-
mational state necessarily requires the presence of an
observer to read off the contents of the representation.
The modified synapse is modified, whether anyone
notices or not. Perhaps more important, it is not clear
what empirical implications bear on this issue, one way
or another. What consequences does it have for the devel-
opmental cognitive neuroscientist studying the mind
whether representations require an observer or not?
What consequences does it have for the developmental
roboticist whose robot continues to show increasingly
adaptive behavioral contingencies in interacting with its
environment, even after its programmer has left the room?
In response to the idea of a partial representation,
Kotchoubey justifiably poses the question of how an
individual might ever attain a “full” representation of a
concept. Here, we agree with Innocenti when he argues
that “partial representations seem to be economical in
terms of neural resources and are open to completion by
developmental experience and/or learning, in adult life.”
We claim the following: For a representation to become
full, the individual must integrate the partial represen-
tations across the entire range of contexts in which the
concept is used. Different subsets of partial represen-
tations may be appropriate for different contexts and
indeed, the only feature common to all contexts of the
full representation may be the presence of a unifying
label. In a sense, the generation of a full representation
is similar to the process undertaken by a philosopher
when he or she considers the coherence of a concept.
What are all the applications of an idea? Philosophers,
however, usually add a further proviso that concepts
should not be context sensitive – a concept should mean
same thing in all situations. While this proviso may opti-
mize philosophical discourse, it may not be a principle to
which the brain adheres.
Lastly, both Bremner & Spence and Campos &
Sotillo raise the important issue of the outcome of devel-
opment. The former argue that representational states are
richer than those simply required to drive behavior in the
moment, while the latter point to the importance of the
late-developing property of explicitization that enables
performance to break free from the context of its acqui-
sition. In each case, development might be argued to
have gone “beyond mastery” (Karmiloff-Smith 1992). We
agree that there are key issues to be explored here. To
these challenges, we might add behaviors that appear
decoupled from the immediate environment, such as
imagination and play. However, we would argue that all
of these are amenable to the neuroconstructivist approach,
with its appeal to multidisciplinary sources of evidence and
formal specification of causal mechanism. We feel that the
important ideas of Rivie`re, as discussed by Campos &
Sotillo, may be in particular need of formal specification
before they can be investigated at a neurocognitive level.
For example, is explicitization a process intrinsic to a rep-
resentation, where a system somehow self-organizes into a
structure that generates new properties in the absence of a
behavioral driver? Or is it more like an enabling of connec-
tivity across systems, perhaps in particular to the language
systems that drive (explicit) verbal report? When a child
moves beyond mastery, is this more than a continued
proactive tendency to query the environment for further
potential sources of reward (novelty) – an idea well under-
stood within the framework of reinforcement learning? Or
does it refer to an internal computational process, for
example a system-wide preference for global consistency
across components of an interactive processing system,
beyond the local consistency that enables a given
subsystem to generate a behavior successfully?
R5. Genetics, lifespan, and evolution
French argues that we have given short shrift to the role of
genetics in cognition, and views as “bordering on the incom-
prehensible” our statement that “in humans, genes provide
only very broad sorts of constraints on the representations
that emerge in cortex.” We are sympathetic to his view; it
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is true that apart from a six-page section in chapter 1 of
Volume I where we discuss the genetics of development,
genes only appear intermittently throughout the volume.
We have endeavored to rectify this in other publications
(see Westermann et al. 2007, Fig. 4) where we emphasize
the place of genes in our framework, and in particular the
probabilistic epigenesis view of development (Gottlieb
1992; 2007). In the latter view, environmental and beha-
vioral influences play a fundamental role in modulating
the expression of genes. We expect that genes will exhibit
a reliance on context (of other genes and of environments)
for their causal effects similar to the contextual effects we
observe at higher levels of description. We might term
the contextual effect at the molecular level as engenement.
Despite our sympathies, there is also a sense in which
we would defend our stance, and hold to our claim regard-
ing the influence of genes on the emergence of represen-
tations in the cortex. While genes inevitably play an
essential role in constructing and maintaining biological
organisms from the moment of the fertilization of the
egg onwards, the key issue at stake is the specificity of
their influence on cognition. At present, while there are
many suggestive correlations between gene variants or
mutations and cognitive variability, there are few examples
of explicit causal pathways that link these levels of descrip-
tion. We maintain that the optimum level of description to
explain children’s behavior is the cognitive level; the aim of
neuroconstructivism is to seek constraints from other
levels of description but not to reduce to them. And the
causal chains linking genes and cognition are extremely
indirect (as indeed they are between, for instance,
sodium channels and cognition).
French mentions the FOXP2 gene, and this is an inter-
esting example. A mutation of this gene produced an
apparent specific deficit of speech and language with
Mendelian inheritance in a British family. Computer
simulations indicated that the human version of this
gene may have appeared relatively recently on an evol-
utionary timescale, around the time language appeared
in humans (see Marcus & Fisher 2003). However, sub-
sequent research indicated that behavioral deficits were
more widespread than language (affected family
members also showed deficits in oral-facial movements,
aspects of the perception of rhythm, production of rhyth-
mic movements of the hand, and on average lower IQ than
unaffected family members) and a range of structural
brain differences were observed when affected family
members were compared to unaffected members or con-
trols (including in sensorimotor cortex, inferior temporal
cortex, inferior frontal cortex, supplementary motor
areas, the planum temporale, caudate nucleus, insula,
putamen, and cerebellum) (see Vargha-Khadem et al.
2005). There is undeniably an uneven cognitive profile
in affected family members, yet the effects of the single
gene mutation were far from specific on either brain or
behavior.
Indeed, Plomin and colleagues have argued both that
relations between genes and cognition are likely to be
many-to-many, so that each gene influences many cognitive
processes and each cognitive process is influenced by many
genes (e.g., Kovacs & Plomin 2006; Plomin & Kovacs 2005;
see also Rutter 2007), and that gene expression is likely to be
distributed widely throughout the brain rather than in
specific regions. Two of the most studied genes within
cognition, COMT and BDNF, have basic neural functions
related to neurotransmitter metabolism and neural growth
respectively, and their expression is found across cortex, cer-
ebellum, caudate nucleus, amygdala, thalamus, and corpus
callosum in both humans and mice (Kovas & Plomin
2006). Given the widespread expression of genes in the
cortex, it might seem reasonable to conclude that they
exert broad sorts of constraints on the representations that
emerge. Of course, this picture may change. The field of
genetic neuroimaging, which studies where and when
various genes are expressed in the brain, is advancing
rapidly. Nevertheless, while we have no doubt that it will
soon be commonplace to include genotype information in
studies of cognition (where it will pick up some proportion
of the variance in behavior, along with other experimental
factors), we believe it premature to identify the exact con-
straints that genes place on current theories of cognitive
development.
Two commentaries urge us to expand the neurocon-
structivist framework in other directions, to incorporate
evolution (Innocenti) and to cover lifespan changes in
cognition rather than just development (Foster et al.).
Innocenti argues that an evolutionary perspective
prompts a greater emphasis on selectionism, where evol-
ution selects certain neural and/or cognitive structures
and development makes a further selection from possible
cognitive architectures depending on the (proactively
defined) environment in which the organism finds itself.
In discussing the apparent opposition between selection-
ism and constructivism, Innocenti draws a contrast
between mechanisms of evolution where “the power of
selection is unchallenged” and the developmental time
frame within which proactivity (or active exploration) is
more important. Recent advances in evolutionary theory
as applied to behavior make us less confident about this
contrast. The fact that the activity of animals, guided by
their embodied brains, changes their environment is well
known. For an extreme example, by damming a river,
families of beavers change their local habitat, flora, and
fauna for several generations. However, this process of
niche construction generates a feedback process in evol-
ution that has only recently been fully recognized
(Olding-Smee et al. 2003). The implications of this new
perspective are that all aspects of niche construction,
including cultural processes in humans, can influence
the selection of genetic variation. Thus, the view is that
there is no longer just passive selection of genes by the
environment, but rather that species can be considered
to create the environment that subsequently selects par-
ticular genes in future generations. We speculate that
different individuals, or groups of individuals, from a
species may create novel niches in a manner similar to
proactivity dependence. Thus, it is possible that a similar
dynamic balance between selectionism and constructivism
occurs in evolution as occurs in individual ontogeny.
For us, one of the key questions in considering the role
of evolution on human cognition is to understand the
levers available to evolution to selectively change aspects
of the brain and/or cognitive system. Work by Finlay
and colleagues (e.g., Finlay & Brodsky 2006; Finlay et al.
2001) demonstrates that a large amount of structural var-
iance in mammalian brains can be explained by a small
number of factors producing nonlinear scaling across
species. This is consistent with the availability of only a
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small number of fairly general genetic levers to change
brain structure rather than a panoply of individual levers
that control specific brain areas or specific cognitive abil-
ities. In particular, a many-to-many mapping between
genes and cognition would make fashioning a particular
cognitive process via evolution problematic. Let us say a
given process increased fitness so that its genes were
more likely to propagate in the population. Under a
many-to-many mapping, the favored genes also contribute
to the development and maintenance of a large number of
other cognitive processes. Selection for the one would
therefore entail selection for the many. In short, for both
evolutionary and genetic contributions to developmental
theory, the key issue is the specificity of the influences
on higher cognition.
We are in agreement with Foster et al. that the neuro-
constructivist framework may be profitably extended to
consider changes over lifespan, where we believe the prin-
ciples we have identified would be equally relevant (see the
work discussed in Section 1). Craik and Bialystok (2006)
recently discussed the generalized lack of an interface
between development and aging research, and we agree
that it is desirable to make links between developmental
and lifespan changes in cognition. We would hesitate to
take a modular view of the development of more fundamen-
tal cognitive abilities but agree with Foster et al. that chron-
otopy may be an important characteristic of the changes
observed in adolescence related to prefrontal cortical func-
tioning. The control, coordination, and flexible use of cogni-
tive abilities is contingent on the development of those
abilities (see also sect. 2). We also find appealing the idea
that aging may appear to be the converse of interactive
specialization, with poorer performance marked by
increases in the number of areas activated in the brain.
Such parallels must be treated with caution, however,
since there may also be differences: Aging has differential
effects across brain regions that find no correspondence
in development (see, e.g., Burke & Barnes 2006), and
aging may alter different neurocomputational properties
than those responsible for changes in network specialization
during development (Li et al. 2001).
R6. Chronotopy, disorders, subjectivity,
complexity, and formal methods
For reasons of space, we deal with a remaining set of ques-
tions more briefly. Issues revolving around chronotopy
arose in several contexts. Bateson highlights the role of
competition in effective reductions in plasticity, where
experiences of one kind can exclude subsequent experi-
ences of another kind (see Richardson & Thomas 2008;
Thomas & Johnson 2006; 2008, for further discussion of
sensitive periods in development and their possible neuro-
computational basis). As we saw above, Foster et al.
discuss how the developmental changes in adolescence
are reliant on the emergence of more fundamental cogni-
tive abilities, and Shultz presents a possible computational
formalism for exploiting previous knowledge in learning
new abilities. Similarly, individual differences in aging
indicate that the changes observed are to some extent
dependent on the outcome of the developmental pro-
cesses that preceded it (Stern 2002). For us, the key
point here is that chronotopy should not be a descriptive
principle – simply identifying the order of developmental
events – but should allude to the causal mechanisms that
explain the necessity of the ordering.
On the topic of developmental disorders, Campos &
Sotillo rightly identify that the neuroconstructivist perspec-
tive has implications for intervention. In particular, it is
important to focus as closely on “scores within the normal
range” or apparently normally developing abilities as on
the impairments, both to verify that these abilities are gen-
uinely developing normally and to evaluate their potential
to serve as scaffolding for apparently weaker abilities. For
example, individuals with Williams syndrome are known to
have visuospatial difficulties that can affect their navigation
skills. This can have an impact on their everyday life – for
example, on making independent trips to the shops.
Language is held to be a relative strength in the disorder.
But is language in Williams syndrome sufficiently well devel-
oped to accommodate a verbal strategy for navigating to the
shops and back? (See Thomas 2004 for a discussion of the
relation of neuroconstructivist research to intervention).
Here is it worth noting that Ramus (2004, p. 100) has
characterized the neuroconstructivist approach as contain-
ing the following axiom: “no cognitive module in the adult
mind can have originated in the newborn mind but must
have been acquired through interaction with the environ-
ment,” with the logical corollary that in the case of develop-
mental disorders, “a cognitive module cannot be
congenitally disrupted.” We should stress that there is no
such axiom. We are as keen as anyone to constrain our
developmental accounts with as wide a range of empirical
evidence from genetics, neurobiology, neuroimaging, com-
putational modeling, and behavioral work as possible to
build models that contain realistic constraints on the speci-
ficity of early deficits and their consequent effects on devel-
opmental trajectories. The neuroconstructivist perspective
on developmental disorders is merely that a theory must
specify starting conditions and the nature of the subsequent
developmental process, and that both these aspects should
be consistent with what is known from developmental cog-
nitive neuroscience (Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith 2002).
Innocenti points out that developmental disorders
stemming from atypical environments can be equally
informative about development. While this was a class of
disorder we identified in Chapter 11 of Volume I, we did
not pursue it in the original volumes. Innocenti is right
to highlight the importance of evidence from, for
example, studies of deprivation and impoverished environ-
ments. Animal work also indicates how enriched environ-
ments can influence neural development, for example for
rats reared in environments of varying complexity
(reviewed in Praag et al. 2002; Rosenzweig 1996).
Enriched environments have been observed to produce
changes in cortical thickness, with larger cell bodies,
more glial cells, and higher dendritic and synaptic
density, as well as an increased rate of neurogenesis. The
role of impoverished and enriched environments in mod-
ifying (or failing to modify) developmental trajectories is a
key avenue of investigation.
Lickliter suggests that we underplayed the importance
of value and meaning in the formation and maintenance of
cognitive representations – in essence, the subjectivity of
the individual. We agree with this criticism in that subjectiv-
ity, and the value system that defines it, was left implicit in
the notion of proactivity. The work of Sporns on robotics in
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Volume II emphasizes how important the concept of value
may be in determining the effective environment for the
individual (e.g., Sporns 2007, p.184). Our review of beha-
vioral genetics in the first chapter of Volume I noted that
in twin studies, most of the variation in behavior attribu-
table to the environment is unique to the individual
(making identical twins look dissimilar) rather than
shared (causing both identical and fraternal twins to look
similar). Therefore, even when the environment appears
similar (such as growing up in the same family or going to
the same school), individuals experience it differently.
A number of the commentaries remark on our prefer-
ence for the use of formal modeling to specify causal
mechanisms underlying developmental change. In some
cases, the comments are optimistic on the gains that
formal modeling will provide (e.g., Bateson), in other
cases, they are pessimistic (e.g., Lickliter). For Lickliter,
the difficulty lies in closed or bidirectional causal loops
between organism and environment at multiple levels,
producing “mind-boggling combinatorial complexity” and
“dizzyingly complex multidetermined phenomena.” In
some ways, we agree with this view. The complexity of
the ongoing interactions at multiple levels of description
makes analysis extremely problematic. Pribram also high-
lights the implication of complexity in the context of
nonlinear dynamics. Formal methods can at least offer a
chance to understand the emergent properties of such
interactions, for example as illustrated by Sirois and
Mareschal’s model of infant habituation (2004). At the
very least, formal models force the investigator to under-
stand the complexity of the theory that is being proposed.
A term like proactivity is easy to postulate at the qualitative
level, but formal modeling uncovers serious issues associ-
ated with it. Allowing a learning system to determine the
nature of its training set by its actions on an environment
places it at great risk of instability. As Ferber recognizes,
this has much in common with the problems faced by
engineering control systems that operate via feedback
(see, e.g., Mees 1981). Without damping, a proactive
system may oscillate between improving on different,
inconsistent parts of the training set. Without time-sensitive
changes of internal state, the system may lapse into locally
stable solutions that are far from optimal for the problem
it faces. The fact that formal approaches reveal such
implications confirms that, however high the Everest of
development may be, formal modeling leads us uphill.
R7. Omissions
As we stated in the preface to Volume I, too many great
people have influenced our thinking for us to be able to
acknowledge each directly. But we are grateful for the
chance to acknowledge some of them here, in response to
the influences recognized by the commentators. For
example, French points out that we had not cited Hebb
(1949) – so pervasive was his influence on our thinking
that we failed to cite him! French also notes the similarities
of our machine-learning analysis of development (see
Mareschal & Thomas 2007) to that proposed by Regier
(1996), which we are happy to acknowledge. Similarly,
Lickliter points out the importance of the work of Walter
Freeman (2001) on the relation between representation
and meaning. While Bateson agrees with much of what
we say, he chastises us for not properly acknowledging
the contributions of many developmentally inclined etholo-
gists and neuroethologists. Of course, it is a hazard in an
interdisciplinary book such as this that experts from any
single one of the constituent fields may feel that their disci-
pline has not been adequately represented in the mix.
However, this particular criticism stings hard because we
consider ethology (as the behavioral development of
animals in their natural environment) a critical and vital
foundation stone for our book. For example, at the start
of chapter 4 of Volume I on embodiment we clearly root
this idea in classical ethology, giving examples from the
work of Tinbergen, Ewert, and Beer among others. We
fully acknowledge that there could have been many other
names added to this list, but our primary objective was to
then merge these ideas with those from robotics and artifi-
cial intelligence, and not to provide a scholarly review of the
ethology literature. For reasons of readability, therefore, we
gave only a few examples. However, we welcome the oppor-
tunity to clarify the seminal importance, and influence on
our thinking, of ethologists such as Bateson, Oyama,
Hinde, and Gottlieb (the latter two already being cited in
the book). For at least one of the authors (M.H.J.), this is
the single most important intellectual tradition that influ-
ences our work. That it continues to be so is evident from
our discussion of niche construction in Section R4.
R8. Conclusion
We are glad to learn from the contributors how they believe
the neuroconstructivist framework can be expanded. The
Neuroconstructivism books are the first steps on a long
road. We have aimed to provide a framework within
which to think about development and the factors affecting
it. We believe that this framework is a powerful one that
integrates disparate fields and levels of description into a
unified whole. Many researchers can contribute to this fra-
mework from their own areas of specialization. The com-
mentators offer clear pointers of the directions in which
neuroconstructivism can expand: a more detailed consider-
ation of the theory of interactive specialization; specification
of the relation between the emergence of partial represen-
tations and developmental changes in abstraction and cog-
nitive flexibility, including the role of the prefrontal cortex;
the important role of genetics in explanations of develop-
ment; the function of value and subjective experience in
proactivity; changes in cognition across lifespan, including
the putative reorganization in adolescence and the pro-
cesses underlying cognitive decline in the aging population;
the effects of atypical environments in deflecting develop-
mental trajectories; the implications of a neuroconstructivist
analysis of developmental disorders for intervention; and, at
the formal level, the implications of closed causal loops
between the individual and his/her environment. With
such avenues to explore, we believe that the multidisciplin-
ary study of development has a rich future in the twenty-
first century.
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NOTE
1. Imagine a layer of processing units fed by two banks of
input units (A and B) and driving a single bank of output units
C. The layer of processing units (the ‘region’) performs categor-
isations over the activity arriving from input A, differentially
driving the bank of output units C, depending on the particular
pattern arriving from A. It is straightforward to demonstrate
that the categorisations that the region carries out on A can be
modulated – indeed completely changed – by activation arriving
from input bank B. The modulation of the region’s computational
properties can occur without any changes to the network’s con-
nection weights, merely via changes in its non-linear activation
dynamics (see, for example, Rogers & McClelland 2004).
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